What does the continued large-scale fighting in the Myanmar civil war mean for India? The violence in Myanmar began when the military forcibly took over power in February 2021, deposing the elected government. In response, three major ethnic armed groups united to form the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA)—the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—which then launched a concerted offensive against the junta forces. Today, the fighting has intensified on many fronts with the Arakan Army taking control of the country’s border with Bangladesh.
Myanmar has seen ethnic insurgencies almost since its independence from British colonial rule in 1948, shaping the contours of the current conflict. Ethnic rebel groups like the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Shan State Army (SSA), and the AA, among others, have been engaged in insurgencies against central authorities for decades. However, the 2021 military coup marked a watershed moment with the formation of the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) by civilians and defectors from Myanmar’s armed forces—beyond just the ethnic militias that had historically opposed the state. The PDF is working with various groups fighting the junta, including the aforementioned TBA. In response, the junta carried out air attacks on its own citizens, provoking further insurgency and causing Myanmar’s people to be caught in a dangerous spiral of violence.
Prior to the coup, India had been successful in building ties with the democratic government in Myanmar. The rise of junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, and the military’s struggle to consolidate power over the entirety of the country’s territory in the face of attacks from the TBA, has multiplied the challenges facing India on its Eastern front.
Gateways, Investments, Ethnic Ties
For India, there is a lot at stake. First, Myanmar is India’s gateway to Southeast Asia, as a whole, given that it is the only country in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with which it shares a land border. In light of the civil war, New Delhi has indicated that it plans to seal the border, but this is not an easy task given the region’s mountainous terrain and copious amounts of rainfall. India has already scrapped the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which—in an acknowledgment of the close ethnic ties in the region—previously allowed any member of a hill tribe and a citizen of either India or Myanmar, and residing “within 16 km of the border on either side, to cross on the production of a border pass, usually valid for a year, and stay up to two weeks per visit.”
Second, India has significant investments in Myanmar, especially in the field of infrastructure, with projects like the Kaladan Multi Modal Transport Corridor Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. These projects face open-ended delays given the ongoing civil strife in the country. Then there are projects like the Sittwe River Port, constructed by the Indian government in 2016, in Myanmar, which is critical in giving Northeast Indian states access to the Bay of Bengal. Notably, the partition of India in 1947 left its Northeastern states, four of which share a border with Myanmar, effectively landlocked—with the Indian-built Sittwe Port offering an alternative.
Third, Myanmar is key to the success of India’s “Act East Policy” which aims at reinvigorating India’s historical ties with countries in Southeast Asia and East Asia. New Delhi has not had much success with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and has instead moved its focus to building ties with Southeast Asia and East Asia. Myanmar is an important member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which connects India, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. With a pro-Indian government having recently been deposed in Bangladesh, any further loss of influence in Myanmar would make the neighborhood even more of a challenge for New Delhi.
Fourth, many of the insurgent outfits in Myanmar are also engaged in the trafficking of drugs and this can have grave consequences for India’s Northeast, which has already seen a spurt in the usage of drugs. In addition, refugees from the border regions of Myanmar are entering the states of Manipur and Mizoram in droves. An unabated influx of people will impact the socio-political environment in the region. Manipur has already been engulfed by ethnic clashes between the Meities (who reside in and around the Imphal valley) and the Kukis (who reside in the surrounding hills), with the embattled state government blaming refugees for some of the violence. The Central Government has recently imposed President’s Rule (direct administration from the Centre) in the state of Manipur after the resignation of its Chief Minister.
The Role of China
India would need to closely look at the role of China in the equation. Beijing has been running with the hares and hunting with the hounds in this area as it has close ties with both the government forces and the opposition groups in the country. For the ruling junta, support from Beijing is absolutely sine qua non as China is a member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and wields veto powers. China also has infrastructural investments in the country, such as an oil and gas pipeline, which runs from southern China all the way to Kyaukpyu in Myanmar. This will allow China to bypass the Straits of Malacca which has always been an Achilles’ heel for China.
China is also Myanmar’s largest trade partner and has huge investment plans for the country. It, like India, would prefer to see an end to the fighting since many of the Beijing-funded and backed infrastructure projects are also on hold, given the ongoing violence. Recently the junta leader Min Aung Hlaing, in his first visit to China since the 2021 coup, visited Kunming in China for the summits of the Greater Mekong Subregion and the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Co-operation Strategy (ACMECS). Beijing has faced pressure from the international community, particularly the US, to end its support for the junta.
In the past, China has lent support to different insurgent groups in Northeast India and this time, it may once again want to fish in troubled waters. New Delhi has been successfully able to sign ceasefire agreements with all the insurgent groups in the region that were previously aimed at the Indian state. If Beijing were to fan these fires again, it would pose an even bigger challenge for India.
Channels and Coordination
There are not many options available to India. India has had official interactions with the junta, while it is unclear if it has been reaching out to the opposition groups, given the lack of public statements to that effect. This may not be sustainable. In recent years, there has been a major investment push into Northeast India to develop the region and build connectivity. For example, the longest bridge in India will be constructed in the region with funding from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). New Delhi would do well to remember that any further spillover from the ongoing violence in Myanmar will negatively impact the region and set it back by a couple of years. While efforts to connect with Opposition groups will surely upset the junta, New Delhi would need to think long-term, especially considering the blowback in Northeastern states like Mizoram and Manipur. In the past, too, New Delhi has had ties with Myanmarese pro-democracy leader, Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) while maintaining good ties with the junta as well.
Myanmar is a member of the ASEAN and effective coordination with the ASEAN is key for India to engage with the junta. It is also worth mentioning here that New Delhi has not joined the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and, hence, connectivity projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway are crucial for India’s “Act-East Policy.” The Northeastern states of India, like Mizoram and Manipur, have seen an influx of people from Myanmar and, hence, it is in New Delhi’s interest to see that the fighting in Myanmar, or at least the bordering regions, comes to an end. New Delhi could also reach out to Russia, a close partner, which also maintains close relations with the Myanmarese junta and is a leading supplier of weaponry to the government forces.
In July 2024, India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval met his Myanmarese counterpart, Admiral Moe Aung in Naypyidaw during a meeting of the security chiefs of the BIMSTEC countries and is understood to have conveyed New Delhi’s concerns regarding the situation in Myanmar.
In the past, New Delhi had been close to Aung San Suu Kyi, but that did not prevent it from opening channels of communication with the junta. The crux of the matter here is that New Delhi would have to go for some innovative diplomacy and out-of-the-box solutions when it comes to handling the situation in Myanmar. With the junta fast losing its grip over many parts of the country, New Delhi would do well to engage the various anti-junta forces as well.
Rupakjyoti Borah is a Senior Research Fellow with the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.
India in Transition (IiT) is published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) of the University of Pennsylvania. All viewpoints, positions, and conclusions expressed in IiT are solely those of the author(s) and not specifically those of CASI.
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