Amid escalating great power rivalry, India’s leadership of the G20 from December 2022 to November 2023 was a test of its diplomatic acumen. Would India be able to successfully host a gathering and ensure a joint statement despite bitter divisions between the West and Russia, while also bridging the gap between developed and developing nations? Would India be able to elevate its global stature in the process, or get mired in the squabbling? The jury is still out, but the consensus seems to be that India succeeded on both these counts. India’s success at the G20 also turned the spotlight on another multilateral forum where it plays a key role—BRICS—which, over the last year, has seen a surge in interest from developing nations, highlighting the desire for an alternative to Western-dominated platforms. However, the expansion of BRICS has sparked concerns about its future viability, given the lack of a formal agenda and existing tensions, particularly between China and India. How should we understand India’s approach and intentions for the G20 and BRICS, and how do we situate these two very different groupings within New Delhi’s broader framework for multilateral diplomacy?
Historically, India’s engagement with these two groupings has been intertwined. Both organizations were established roughly during the same period—the first decade of the 21st century. Initially, India was skeptical of the G20 and unsure of its role within the grouping. Though the G20—founded as an intergovernmental forum that would allow the world’s largest economies to coordinate responses to major financial and economic challenges—was projected as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South, India feared that the more influential countries would treat the Global South members as mere junior partners. BRICS, on the other hand, represented a solidarity group of non-Western countries that were poised to experience handsome economic growth in the subsequent years. The non-Western character of the BRICS was more attractive to India as it could take forward its historical legacy of championing the cause of the Global South by challenging the Western-led order.
Since all five BRICS members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—were, at the time, also a part of the G20, they could act as a bloc within the larger grouping. This meant the G20 was akin to a hedging platform for the BRICS members, who could both cooperate with and resist the Western nations. Thus, through the first few years of their existence, the BRICS collectively used the G20 stage to push for reforms of the Bretton Woods system, which governs monetary relations between nations, and to highlight issues of global inequality. However, their appeals were overlooked by the Western bloc within the G20. There seemed to be a rift within the G20 between the two factions and, in this period, the BRICS members conceived of alternate economic institutions that would be more attuned to the requirements of the developing countries. Subsequently, India played a major part in the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014 to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies.
Even though the NDB was an important landmark in the cooperative journey of BRICS, it was not long before serious intra-group disagreements began to surface regarding the operational principles of the NDB. The original vision of BRICS was to establish a more equitable global economic order, enhance financial cooperation, and increase trade among member nations. However, these objectives were significantly hampered by ongoing India-China border disputes since 2017, and Russia's military activity first in Crimea and then in Ukraine, which led to political and economic tensions within the group. These conflicts undermined the trust and unity necessary for BRICS to effectively collaborate on large-scale economic initiatives, reduce dependency on Western financial systems, and present a united front in global economic forums. Additionally, a foundational lack of cohesion in terms of political values, domestic governmental setup, and economic interests along with competing geopolitical aspirations undermined the potency of the BRICS. The diminishing importance of the BRICS coincided with a renewed emphasis on multilateralism for India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The G20 has been at the center of this renewed emphasis. India’s initial pessimism vis-à-vis the G20 gave way to optimism and an effort to use the forum as a platform to showcase India’s leadership credentials at a time of global division.
India’s embrace of the G20 can be explained through factors operating at the systemic as well as the domestic level. The foremost systemic level dynamic has been the rise of China and the subsequent US-China polarization, which has weakened the multilateral framework. Under US President Donald Trump’s inward-looking influence, the US’s reticence to continue playing the role of a global leader created a vacuum that China was best poised to fill. India too, aided by a rise in its material capabilities, sensed an opportunity to increase its influence in multilateral institutions. It also felt the need to resist a Chinese takeover of the multilateral framework. Consequently, India’s strategic alignment with the US grew stronger, driven by a shared interest in balancing China's rising power. This convergence is evident in various bilateral and multilateral engagements, including the Quad, aimed at ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific. India considered itself well-placed to steer the world through this crisis of multilateralism by facilitating a consensus between the Global North and the Global South at the G20.
At the domestic level, the portrayal of India as a global leader resonates strongly with its domestic electorate, further aiding Prime Minister Modi’s popularity. The G20 is particularly advantageous because it addresses issues like economic growth, trade, and financial stability—areas where India seeks to assert its influence. Modi has sought to use the G20 platform to effectively highlight India's leadership in solving global economic challenges, thereby reinforcing his appeal to voters as a strong and visionary leader capable of advancing India’s global ambitions. This projection hinges on the concept of India as a “Vishwaguru,” symbolizing its historical resilience against colonialism and its potential to reclaim a prominent position internationally. The G20 presidency marks a significant milestone in this narrative, aligning with the Hindu nationalist ideology of Modi’s party, the BJP. While Modi’s utilization of the G20 presidency to enhance India’s global stature was praised by supporters, critics argued it masked domestic issues and served mainly as a campaign tactic for the 2024 elections, which saw Modi retaining the PM post for a third consecutive term.
The G20 Summit meeting in September 2023 in New Delhi was widely deemed a success. India was especially praised for its push for inclusivity which saw the African Union gaining a permanent seat at the forum. India’s new-found status within the G20 has raised questions about the utility of BRICS in its diplomatic calculus. There have been suggestions that since it no longer serves any political or economic objective, India should quit the BRICS altogether and focus more on the G20. It should not. Even though India oversaw a successful presidential year at the G20, it must not undermine the BRICS, let alone quit it.
While it is true that BRICS has faced significant challenges, including intra-group disagreements and geopolitical conflicts, it remains a crucial element of India's broader strategic framework. As a forum of the Global South, BRICS provides India with a platform to advocate for the interests of developing nations and to push for reforms in global governance structures that are often dominated by Western powers. Initiatives such as the NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) exemplify how BRICS countries can pool resources to support sustainable development and financial stability. It also complements India's engagement with other multilateral institutions like the G20 and offers a unique avenue for India and China to work together on common economic and developmental goals, even amidst broader geopolitical rivalries. Hence, India cannot afford to undermine the BRICS as doing so might give impetus to China’s claims to be the only true representative of the Global South. For instance, India was apprehensive that China would try to make BRICS an anti-Western and pro-China grouping by giving out membership to countries closer to itself. India’s influence was critical in giving the BRICS expansion a more balanced direction. India shares friendly relations with all new BRICS members and besides Iran, the four other new members—Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates—are expected to resist an overt anti-Western outlook for the grouping. Thus, for India, the function of the BRICS has evolved from providing a platform to promote Global South solidarity in its early years to keeping a check on China’s dominance in the Global South.
Historically, India has projected itself as the flagbearer of the Global South. However, of late, China too has invested its resources in establishing institutions through which it can act as a leader of the Global South. Other multilateral organizations aimed at non-West nations, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are structurally dominated by China. BRICS, on the contrary, is the only such platform that is based on the principle of equality at the core of it. Thus, as India consolidates its position within the G20, its continued involvement in BRICS remains crucial in maintaining a balance of power within the Global South and resisting potential hegemonic aspirations from other member states, particularly China.
Abhinandan Kumar is a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India.
India in Transition (IiT) is published by the Center for the Advanced Study of India (CASI) of the University of Pennsylvania. All viewpoints, positions, and conclusions expressed in IiT are solely those of the author(s) and not specifically those of CASI.
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