

Rethinking Inequality: Dalits in Uttar Pradesh in the Market Reform Era

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In the debates surrounding the consequences of India's shift from a state-led to a market-oriented economic model, the issue of caste and caste practices, particularly for dalits, has been an empirical weak link. We draw on a unique survey designed and implemented by members of the dalit community to capture social practices and conditions important to them which are not featured in the usual household surveys. This survey asked *all* dalit households in two blocks of Uttar Pradesh (Azamgarh and Bulandshahar districts) both about conditions currently and in 1990. The survey results suggest that placing exclusive focus on measures of material well-being, such as consumption expenditure and its inequality, is misplaced as it misses important changes in socially structured inequalities and hence in individuals' functioning.

Bhaju Ram, Rajesh Paswan, Pankaj K Pracheta and Niraj Kumar were the leaders of the survey teams. Atul Pokarel provided critical support in putting together the survey instrument, cleaning the data and checking data integrity. Kavya Akash provided assistance in construction of the various indices and variable definitions.

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Popular media and academic descriptions of India's rapid economic transformation in the era of market reforms often come with a "but": "But development has also disrupted existing ways of living. It has strained the social and cultural fabric of the villages" (Kapur 2009). If post-Foucauldian social science has any insight to offer, surely it is that, given the social construction of the present and the past, the nostalgia of elites is an unreliable guide to the actual experiences of marginalised social groups. As B R Ambedkar recognised more than six decades ago (1994: 61-62):¹

The love of the intellectual Indians for the village community is of course infinite if not pathetic... What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness, and communalism?

Precisely the people and groups pressured into social inferiority by the "cultural fabric of the villages" generally lacked access both to media outlets and to the technical tools of academia for structuring discourse, both of words and numbers. Do dalits' own assessments of the era of market reform come with a "but" or with an "and"?

We add to the existing literature on the evolution of well-being during the era of market reforms using a survey constructed by dalits, implemented by dalits and administered to all dalit households in two blocks of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The blocks chosen are Bilaria Ganj in Azamgarh district in eastern UP and Khurja in Bulandshahar district in western UP (hereafter referred to as eastern block and western block respectively). The instrument, uniquely among existing large-scale surveys, asks specifically about changes since 1990 in a variety of caste practices at the household and social level. With this data, we can document three massive changes in the areas surveyed.

First, there have been major changes in the grooming, eating, and ceremonial consumption patterns of dalits, signalling higher social status through adoption of higher status consumption patterns. Dalits shifted out of low status (but highly calorie intensive) foods like sugar cane juice and *roti chatni* into diets containing (unbroken) rice, fresh vegetables and spices. Use of high-status foods in social occasions like weddings also increased.

Second, respondents report changes in the accepted behaviours between castes, with rapid erosion in discriminatory processes that stigmatised dalits. By and large in these blocks, dalits are less likely to be seated separately at weddings, they are no longer expected to handle the dead animals of other castes, there is a noticeable increase in births in dalit households that are attended by non-dalit midwives, and non-dalits increasingly accept hospitality in dalit homes. None of these practices were common in 1990.

Third, there have been large shifts in the pattern of economic life, both away from and within the villages. There has been a considerable increase in (mostly) circular migration to distant cities to work with nearly half of dalit households in the eastern block having a member in the cities. In the villages, dalits have also shifted into professions, as tailors, masons, and drivers, and into businesses, as grocers or paan shop owners. Agricultural relations have changed such that almost no dalits participate in bonded economic ties, such as *halwaha*, and fewer dalits even perform agricultural labour on lands owned by upper castes. Dalits now are much more likely to contract in factors such as tractors or land from high-caste groups than sell their labour to them.

Inequality in What? For Whom?

India's socially marginalised populations suffer from two key forms of disadvantage – social indignity and material poverty – which emerge from intertwined social and economic inequalities. Empirical assessments in India tend to conflate the two into measures of material well-being, such as poverty or inequality, or “neutral” social indicators like education, health, or nutrition outcomes. Even if the distinction between indignity and economic status arises, it is treated as axiomatic that the first is completely dependent on the second. Even when attention is turned to caste, often the data compares outcomes on standard indicators such as consumption expenditures, education across castes, but with almost no attention to how caste markers, behaviours, and practices themselves may have changed.

Many have expressed the concern that the growth of the market economy in India unleashes inequality-increasing forces. Dev and Ravi (2007: 509) reach a “clear conclusion” that inequality “increased significantly in the post-reform period”, a conclusion shared by other researchers (Himanshu 2007; Datt and Ravallion 2010). But the exclusive use of consumption expenditures or differences across castes in a few outcomes as measures of inequality cannot be adequate in the many parts of rural India where signs of social inequality, such as servility, humiliation, lack of self-respect, are important. Comparing consumption expenditure-based inequality statistics across states immediately reveals the incompleteness of the picture they present.

Table 1 shows that the Gini index of consumption expenditure inequality is considerably greater in Kerala than in UP, in both rural and urban areas. Moreover, the difference between Kerala and Bihar or UP are substantially larger than the all-India changes, so the gap between UP and Kerala in urban areas in 2005 is 0.044 points versus a total all-India change of 0.034 points. Thus, despite substantially lower inequalities in human capital in Kerala relative to UP in the early 1980s as well as two decades later, in 2005, Kerala had more consumption inequality. Simply comparing consumption expenditures or consumption inequality alone would lead one to conclude that Kerala is more unequal than UP. But such a conclusion would contradict the findings of a host of studies extolling the greater commitment to equality of the Kerala model of development. The reason is that the cognitive and social aspects of inequality – self-respect, servility, full participation in social and political life – need to be factored in to make an adequate comparison.

Table 1: Comparison of Gini Coefficient of Consumption Inequality between Kerala and UP

Region	Rural/Urban	1983-84	2004-05	Change
All-India	Rural	0.308	0.305	-0.003
Kerala	Rural	0.32	0.382	0.062
UP	Rural	0.292	0.29	-0.002
Excess of Kerala over UP		0.028	0.092	
All-India	Urban	0.341	0.375	0.034
Kerala	Urban	0.39	0.41	0.02
UP	Urban	0.372	0.366	-0.006
Excess of Kerala over UP		0.018	0.044	

Source: Dev and Ravi (2007).

Using consumption inequality from either Himanshu (2007) or the Planning Commission gives similar results.

As elsewhere in rural India, in rural UP, caste has played a key role in structuring individual identity, limiting economic choices, and reinforcing patterns of consumption consonant with the identification of dalits as social inferiors. In evaluating the evolution of the well-being of dalits and other socially excluded groups during the era of market reform, a period that also coincides with increasing political empowerment of dalits in UP, one cannot simply assume how the complex interplay of economic, political and social has played out. As Chandhoke (2009: 141) points out, “the link between redistribution (of material resources) and what has come to be known as recognition (development of feelings of self-respect)” has “proved to be more tenuous than originally conceived by egalitarians” especially since recognition “is not so easily commanded by politics”.

Passing a law against discrimination will not make an upper caste invite a lower-caste person into his house, or, even if he does, to offer him something to eat and drink. Conversely, perhaps an increasing penetration of markets may increase income and consumption inequality overall, but the move to arms-length market transactions may have socially egalitarian consequences on the recognition dimension. This could be much more important in rural India as social inequalities shape the daily lives of marginalised populations. Improvements in self-respect in daily interactions may matter more to rural dalits than the income inequality from increases in wealth among Mumbai industrialists or Bangalore information technology tycoons. But before changes in caste differences can be evaluated and valued, they must first be measured.

Survey Instrument and Methods

The data we analyse is unique, in four key ways.

First, our data is a census covering all dalit households – a total of 19,087 – in the eastern as well as the western block. In each village in these two blocks, two survey instruments were administered: a village instrument which collected data about the economic and social characteristics of the village; and a household instrument applied to *all dalit* households in the village, not just to a sample. While we do not wish to claim that these two blocks are representative of the broader geographical area, the two districts – Azamgarh and Bulandshahar – were purposively chosen as instances of the range in UP to illuminate the socio-economic dynamics sweeping the state.

The physical distance between the two districts is almost 800 kilometres. Bulandshahar district, an early beneficiary of the green revolution, is more fertile and richer compared to Azamgarh

district. As of the late 1990s, 10% of the population of Bulandshahar was below the poverty line, whereas the incidence was four times greater in Azamgarh. Furthermore, Bulandshahar's proximity to Delhi has made it more integrated into the nearby urban economy; Azamgarh is more remote. Within the districts, the blocks were chosen to be as "typical" as possible, if anything somewhat poorer and more remote than the blocks containing the district centre.

Second, lifestyle changes can only be understood in a comparative perspective, presenting us with two alternatives: comparing the lifestyles of dalits with non-dalits, or comparing the present lifestyle of dalits with their past. We chose the second approach, which in turn determined instrument design and choice of enumerators. We sought to understand changes in the food habits, lifestyle, caste practices, mobility and occupations of dalit households since 1990. In the absence of any previous study on these topics, there was no alternative but to ask people for their recollection of previous conditions, with all the limitations this implies. However, as subjective well-being is the primary phenomena of interest and changes in "capabilities" may affect perceptions of well-being, it is not at all clear that comparisons of responses at two points of time are superior to recall data. Moreover, the danger of recall bias is outweighed also by the desire for a current assessment of caste phenomena. Ironically, while there is broad unanimity on the past plight of dalits (though this too is socially constructed by present power relationships), differences often arise on present conditions.

The reference period was chosen as 1990 to capture people's recollection of conditions before the more aggressive and open market liberalisation efforts at the national level that began in 1991. One risk of recall is that people generally have a difficult time anchoring in a specific period. It is often difficult to tell whether questions about conditions 20 years ago elicit responses of "a long time ago" or "ten years ago" and if people's responses are pushed into the far distant past. This may overstate the apparent changes.

However, when dalits and non-dalits alike were asked in unstructured ways (for instance, as part of a film that was made in conjunction with this research effort) about how much things had changed, the query elicited comments like "night and day" or "the world has been turned upside down". When asked when these changes began, the most commonly proposed timing was "10 to 15 years ago" which, as the survey was carried out in early 2008 would have dated the changes to beginning 1992 to 1997, which was shortly after the reference period.

We further addressed the question of recall bias by comparing the answers from households with younger (less than 40) and older heads, each of whom might have very different "telescoping" propensities, and found no evidence of recall bias working in any particular direction. Finally, the survey also has questions on physical assets such as cellphone ownership, where it is easy to check if the responses for the earlier period are more optimistic than the reality, since we know that cellphones were simply not around in 1990.

Third, the survey is unique in that the questions were developed by dalits to reflect economically and socially salient

changes for dalits. Our survey instrument reflects our belief that, while there are many aspects of well-being that are objective, many others are contextual to the lived experience of peoples in these communities and cannot be reduced to the lens that standard government-mobilised survey instruments use to "see", and hence structure reality (Scott 1998). Amartya Sen has emphasised that well-being is subjectively assessed and emphasises capabilities and functionings that reflect a particular subjective valuation. However, in empirical practice, this conceptual insight has congealed into merely emphasising a slightly different set of outcomes, and somewhat dissimilar set of summary statistics, while the question of *whose* views matter in the *design* of the survey instrument is ignored.

For instance, Bourdieu's *Distinction* (1984) emphasises that the consumption choices individuals make are not merely the result of homogeneous agents. Rather they reflect constructed social "fields" that agents and agency of individuals are embedded in. He shows that choices of individuals about music, art, food are shaped not just by freely floating preferences or idiosyncratic tastes, but rather are deeply influenced by individuals' conception of themselves, their identity and role in the pre-formed fields of social orders. Individuals choose based on their (re)presentation of their identities, which go beyond broad structures such as class, to their social world.

Our survey instrument asks about consumption of specific items through which dalits have expressed their desire for increased status. Consumerism, or gaining social status through consumption patterns, has many drawbacks, particularly for those whom social status is assured through other means. But, at the same time the restructuring of social fields such that the acquisition of status now becomes possible through consumption opens opportunities for a new freedom – a freedom to attain status, something that has been historically unattainable.

The inevitable disadvantage to this approach is that we have less direct comparability with other surveys. However, perhaps this will change in the future. For instance, the recent *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress* recommends that (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009: 12) "...the time is ripe for our measurement system to shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measuring people's well-being." Since "objective and subjective dimensions of well-being are both important" (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009: 14-15) therefore:

...the Commission has identified the following key dimensions that should be taken into account... (i) Material living standards (income, consumption and wealth); (ii) Health; (iii) Education; (iv) Personal activities including work; (v) Political voice and governance; (vi) Social connections and relationships; (vii) Environment (present and future conditions); and (viii) Insecurity, of an economic as well as a physical nature.

Our process of bottom-up elaboration of the survey instrument led us to include several of these dimensions. Furthermore, the social changes captured by our survey instrument are a measure of sustainable social change. While incomes can go up and down, and while there are always fractures possible in the internalisation of social position, changes of a certain magnitude are irreversible. Once dalits have looked directly into the eyes of upper

castes instead of lowering their own eyes in servility, things will never be the same again.

Fourth, given the unique subject matter, the survey used only dalit enumerators, whose presence in the village was facilitated by people known to the residents. The quality of any survey data is afflicted by the incentives and capabilities of the different actors in the survey chain – be they respondents, enumerators, collection entities or data analysts (Herrera and Kapur 2007). Targeted programmes create the legitimate fear of losing access to programme benefits, either individually, by being taken off below poverty line listings, or collectively. This creates powerful incentives for individuals to under-report their income and assets. Even with the facilitation of fellow dalits known to the villagers, the enumerators experienced instances in which they felt respondents were deliberately understating their true asset ownership or lifestyle.²

In addition to respondent incentives, it is unclear how reliable non-dalit government enumerators have been with regard to data collection on dalits. Historically, due to their social and cultural reluctance to enter into dalit hamlets or households, many survey enumerators would elicit information about all of the dalit households from one or two key respondents in the dalit hamlet. This could be interpreted as untouchability in practice, but was simply a result of shirking and apathy in class terms.

'The World Turned Upside Down'

Our survey documents five types of changes in consumption patterns and social behaviours: (1) grooming; (2) eating practices; (3) community social occasions, for example, transport to weddings or what guests are fed; (4) inter-personal relationships across communities, for example, accepting snacks, mid-wifery, hiring upper-caste men to till dalits' land with tractors; and (5) social relationships across communities, for example, separate seating at weddings. In each of these social domains, our survey demonstrates four important trends. First, there have been not just changes but *massive* changes. Second, these changes are not just a continuation of previous trends but a sharp *acceleration* in the pace of change. Third, while many social practices are positively associated with households' level of material well-being and while there have been considerable improvements in material well-being, the observed changes in wealth alone, as proxied by changes in an index of assets do not explain the magnitude of the changes in social practices. Fourth, there are often differences across the two blocks in the level and pace of change.

Changes in Asset Ownership

We begin with reporting the results on changes in material well-being, principally because in discussing the social changes below, we wish to emphasise that the social changes are far larger than would be expected from the material changes alone. Table 2 reports much higher levels of ownership of basic consumer durables in 2007 than in 1990 and improvement in the quality of housing. Ownership of bicycles, fans, tvs, and of course, mobile phones, all increased by typically a third to a half of households. (Reassuringly, on the question of recall bias,

almost no one remembered owning a cellphone before 1990.) However, these improvements were from a very low base, as this is still a very poor group of people, poorer in the eastern block than in the western block. There was also a very substantial improvement in housing, with 64.4% and 94.6% respectively in the eastern and western blocks reporting they now live in *pakka* housing compared to 18.1% and 38.4% respectively in 1990.

We use Principal Component Analysis on these 10 asset/housing indicators to construct an index of assets from the first principal component as a proxy for each household's wealth or long-run income (Filmer and Pritchett 2001). Looking at the index based in 2007 (the overall mean across the two blocks in 2007 is zero by construction), we see there has been substantial increase in the asset index, by 1.56 units (almost a full standard deviation) in the eastern block and by more than a standard deviation in western block, increasing by 2.39 units. These are massive increases in assets'; nearly every household had a lower asset index in 1990 than the *average* index in 2007.

While one might think of this as a change in material status only, there is also a social component to consumption, which in the case of dalits is a plus in and of itself. As markets expand, consumer durables such as cellphones, scooters, tvs, etc, become the markers of social prestige. Dalits can now buy and brandish them. While some might decry this consumerism, the only marker of prestige earlier was one's birth and dalits, being at the bottom, could not alter their social standing irrespective of their economic position. Consequently, an increase in access to status, even from consumption goods, is an expansion in freedoms.

Changes in Grooming Practices

We start our analysis of social changes per se with three seemingly trivial and socially insignificant consumer items: personal grooming products such as toothpaste, shampoo and bottled hair oil. As Adam Smith argued, poverty is a contextual social construct of the minimum standards a person must meet to appear in society without shame. If dalits were treated as social inferiors, then they also could (and in many instances could only) appear in society with lower (or at least different) standards of personal appearance. Changes in grooming and in dress itself are an assertion of social aspirations.

Table 2: Changes in Asset Ownership (1990-2007)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)			
	1990 (%)	2007 (%)	Change	1990 (%)	2007 (%)	Change	
Live in a pakka house	18.1	64.4	46.3	38.4	94.6	56.2	
Have a TV set	0.9	22.2	21.1	0.7	45.0	44.3	
Basic phone	0.2	1.8	1.6	0.1	2.8	2.7	
Mobile	0.1	36.3	36.2	0.2	32.5	32.3	
Pressure cooker	1.3	16.8	15.5	0.6	32.4	31.8	
Fans	2.1	36.7	34.6	4.5	61.4	56.9	
Use firewood for fuel	98.7	97.0	-1.7	98.9	98.5	-0.4	
Bicycle	46.6	84.1	37.5	37.7	83.7	46.0	
Motorcycle/scooter	0.7	7.6	6.9	0.7	12.3	11.6	
Chairs	1.6	17.0	15.4	1.1	38.2	37.1	
Asset index, base 2007	Mean	-2.03	-4.74	1.56	-1.95	.438	2.39
	Standard deviation	.594	1.71	.588	1.83		

Source: Authors' calculations.

Table 3 shows the massive shifts in the use of the three personal grooming products the survey asked about, as well as two items of dress – petticoats and shoes/slippers in public. Almost none of the respondents recall using these items in 1990 while today over half of the people in both blocks report someone in the household using each of the three items, with the exception of hair oil in the western block. Dalits who used *none* of these three items went down by more than 80%.

Table 3: Changes in Grooming Practices among Dalits (1990-2007, in %)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)		
	1990	2007	Change	1990	2007	Change
Uses toothpaste ^a	2.2	53.6	51.4	2.9	82.3	79.4
Uses shampoo ^a	0.8	84.5	83.7	0.7	55.8	55.1
Uses bottled hair oil ^a	6.4	59.1	52.7	0.6	22.5	21.9
Uses none of the three	92.9	11.4	-81.5	96.8	15.6	-81.2
Elderly wear slippers in public ^a	59.6	99.3	39.7	93.3	99.3	6.0
Women wear petticoats ^a	90.6	98.9	8.3	97.9	99.3	1.4

a Respondents saying “always” or “often”, compared to “never” or “rarely”.
Source: Authors’ calculations.

Is this a continuation or an acceleration of previous trends? As the data only has two periods, the current period and recall of 1990, it might seem impossible to answer this question. However, zero use is a lower bound on usage rates. If we assume that use was exactly zero in 1973 (17 years before 1990) and calculate the fastest that usage could have grown before the survey (from 1973 to 1990), i.e., the maximum percentage point per annum growth in use in the period prior to 1990 consistent with the observed (recall) levels in 1990. In the western block, toothpaste utilisation rose from 2.9% to 82.3% in 17 years, which is an average rate of 4.7% of the population per year. Since utilisation in 1990 was only 2.9%, the fastest it could have grown in the previous 17 years was under the extreme assumption that use was exactly zero in 1973 which means use grew *at most* by 0.2% per year. Hence, even though we do not have data from before 1990, we can still know that the percentage point per annum rate of increase in toothpaste use was *at least* 27 times faster from 1990 to 2007, compared to the period between 1973 and 1990.


These observed changes might be just a consequence of the simple fact that people with more income or wealth consume more material goods of all types. The right panels of Figure 1 address the question of whether the increase in assets alone can explain the increase in use of grooming products. We do this by estimating the relationship at the household level between the asset index and, for instance, as illustrated in Figure 1, toothpaste use in 2007. We then use that relationship to predict the average toothpaste use in 1990 using the average level of the 1990 asset index.

Even though households with more assets use more toothpaste and average

assets increased, this only accounts for a small fraction of the observed change. Take the example of the western block. The *predicted* level of toothpaste use in 2007 of a household with 1990 level assets was 66% – compared to the actual use in 1990 of only 3%. So, if we decompose the change in usage into an “income” component and a “social shift” component, the difference between the actual level of toothpaste use of 82% and the 1990 income predicted use of 66% can be accounted for by the increase in assets (moving along a given relationship) but this still leaves the vast majority of the shift – from 3% to 66% *at the same level of assets* – to be explained by other factors. We can also run this same procedure the other way, take the relationship between asset index and toothpaste use in 1990 and predict what use would be in 2007 due to just the increase in the asset index. Again, the massive increase in assets does predict that use would have increased from 3% in 1990 to 19% in 2007, still leaving 73% of the increase unexplained.

The four major facts: (1) massive change, (2) acceleration on past trends, (3) not mechanically accounted for by material changes, and (4) differences across blocks are all illustrated in the four panels of Figure 1 using toothpaste use.³ All panels show the magnitude of the change in the fraction of dalits using toothpaste as the vertical shift upwards in use. The left panels show for each block that the change from 1990 to 2007 was a dramatic *acceleration* over the even the fastest possible change in the previous 17 years, illustrated with the assumption of zero use in 1973.⁴ The right panels show that the changes are much larger than would have been expected just based on the upward shift in assets; the vertical distances are the toothpaste usage differences between the two periods of households of equivalent assets in each period. Finally, comparing the top and bottom panels shows the difference in the starting levels and the pace of change between the two blocks (as well as the difference in average assets

Figure 1: Changes in Toothpaste Use among Dalits in UP (1990-2007)



between the two blocks as the asset index is on a common scale). We use similar graphs to illustrate changes in other personal and social practices in the following sections.

We deliberately began with seemingly trivial items like toothpaste and shampoo. Elites, whose social standing is never in question, find it easy to dismiss the increased consumption of these items as a baneful product of mass merchandising, encouraging people who cannot afford it to waste their money just to keep up with social elites. But an alternative view is that the market provides a space dalits can use to assert their status in their self-presentation.

Changes in Eating Habits

Table 4 shows the shifts in eating habits among dalits. Some foods with low social markers, which were the community’s main sources of calories, have practically disappeared and new elements, such as spices and vegetables have appeared. Another example are drinks made of either sugar cane, in winter, or from hardened molasses or jaggery *rus*, in summer. These are high calorie-intensive drinks that provide energy for manual labour but have little other nutritional content. As these drinks were often provided by landlords for their workers in the field as part of the wage, these came to be associated with agricultural labour and low social status. Often non-dalits too would consume these drinks but more often than not, it was matter of choice, rather than necessity as in the case of dalits. This drink has essentially disappeared in both blocks, with the shift beginning much sooner in the western block.


Table 4: Changes in Eating Habits among Dalits (1990-2007, in %)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)		
	1990	2007	Change	1990	2007	Change
Does not eat broken rice ^a	46.0	97.4	51.4	77.3	98.9	21.6
Does not eat “savan” rice ^a	46.1	99.8	53.7	91.9	99.6	7.7
Does not eat roti chatni for lunch ^a	18.4	97.8	79.4	18.3	90.9	72.6
Does not pluck pea (matar) leaves for saag ^a	11.5	83.6	72.1	71.7	96.9	25.2
Does cook pulses ^b	31.0	90.0	59.0	60.1	96.9	36.8
Children not served previous night’s leftovers ^a	4.1	83.8	79.7	32.0	86.5	54.5
Does not drink sugar cane juice in winter ^a	13.7	96.5	82.8	78.1	98.7	20.6
Does not drink jaggery rus in summer ^a	13.1	92.4	79.3	94.9	98.5	3.6
Uses packaged salt ^b	1.1	71.2	70.1	0.4	87.5	87.1
Uses cardamom or elayachi ^b	5.0	86.9	81.9	0.3	5.9	5.6
Buys tomatoes ^b	23.9	87.7	63.8	3.2	56.8	53.6

a “Does not” aggregates the “never” or “rarely” responses.
 b “Does” or “uses” or “buys” aggregates the “often” or “always” responses.
 Source: Authors’ calculations.

Figure 2 shows the rapid disappearance of roti chatni, a staple in the earlier period, from the diet. In 1990, only 18% of households in either block reported “never” or “rarely” eating this,

Figure 2: Changes in the Consumption of Roti Chatni as a Staple in the Dalit Diet (1990-2007)



while by 2007, this food was rarely admitted to be in the diet, with 98% in the eastern block and 91% in the western block reporting no longer eating it. Again, as seen in the right panel for each block, the wealth improvements alone do not explain the huge shift.

In addition to the low status items dropped from the diet, there have also been new additions. Tomato, packaged salt, and cardamom were uncommon to non-existent in the diets of dalits in 1990 but they are now part of regular consumption items, with the exception of cardamom in western block where the uptake is relatively modest. These changes in eating habits go beyond the usual shifts associated with higher incomes. The rapid disappearance of foods that were status markers highlights the effort, and ability, of dalits to shift towards higher social status foods and empirically affirms Gopal Guru’s (2009b) argument that foods serve as a metaphor for cultural hierarchies.

Deaton and Dreze (2009) have highlighted the puzzle that while there are many indicators of economic progress in India, caloric intake appears to have fallen since the early 1980s. Some use this indicator to suggest that the gains from economic growth have not benefited the poor. In our household survey, people were asked if their food and clothing situation today was “worse”, “as it was”, “improved”, or “much better” than in 1990. In both blocks, less than 2% of households responded that their food and clothing situation was either the same or worse, while 61% in the eastern block and 38% in the western block responded that their situation was “much better”.

Obviously, people can feel their food situation is “much better” (and have higher disposable income) but consume the same (or less) calories, if they are buying things other than calories with their food. It is well known that typically quality upgrading raises costs per calorie, as Dreze and Deaton suggest, but this research

raises the question of the extent to which dalits are buying status by upgrading their food habits to eliminate invidious social distinctions revealed in what people eat. This is a factor not captured in the standard measures of either expenditures or calories.⁵

Changes in Social Occasions within the Community

The items discussed so far related to private consumption, which signals social status and reflect patterns of status upgrading. Now we turn to practices that are explicitly *social*, around weddings and visits of relatives, but which still reflect within-caste behaviour. Again, these show massive change. Practices that were rare – such as taking the groom to the bride's village in a car or jeep (or caravan of cars/jeeps) rather than walking or in a cart – have become socially obligatory. Moreover, the foods served to the wedding party have been upgraded. Whereas formerly *bheli*

Table 5: Changes in Consumption Patterns around Weddings and Hospitality for Visitors (1990-2007, in %)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)		
	1990	2007	Change	1990	2007	Change
Car or jeep to take groom's marriage party to bride's village ^b	33.8	99.4	65.6	2.5	98.8	96.3
Car or jeep to bring bride back to groom's village ^b	33.5	99.7	66.2	2.8	99.3	96.5
Do not serve bheli to baratis ^a	33.1	98.2	65.1	94.3	99.5	5.2
Do serve ladoos to baratis ^b	32.6	99.2	66.6	2.7	96.7	94.0
Not offer wheat fodder as mattress to baratis ^a	34.5	98.3	63.8	73.9	99.0	25.1
Offers visiting relatives tea ^b	14.3	93.4	79.1	6.0	94.4	88.4
Serves roti-rice-pulse-vegetable to visiting relatives ^b	41.2	98.7	57.5	2.9	58.2	55.3

a "Does not" aggregates the "never" or "rarely" responses; b Aggregates the "often" or "always" responses.

Source: Authors' calculations.

was an acceptable sweet, these have now disappeared in favour of *ladoos* (Table 5).

A noticeable change is in the mode of transport used in the wedding party's journey from the groom's village to the bride's village. People recall the use of a car or jeep as non-existent in 1990 in the western block, although already a third of households used this mode in the eastern block by 1990. By 2007, the expectation for the appropriate arrival mode for the groom's party is by car or jeep and the practice is nearly universal in both the blocks. As Figure 3 shows, even the poorest dalits now use a car/jeep for weddings.⁶ The same is true for the journey back to the groom's village after the wedding ceremony.

Along with weddings, there is also evidence on the standards of hospitality for visiting relatives. Offering tea has become nearly universal, a clear social marker. Offering a meal of nicer foods has become more prevalent in the western block, and universal in the eastern block.

Again, one could cite the baneful effects of parents having to pay for the cars, and the financial burdens of pressuring poorer dalits to signal their status through "wasteful" consumption during social ceremonies. However, we feel this would be missing the deeper point of the positive change that dalits feel that they are entitled to as much as anyone else – that it is socially appropriate for them to engage in social practices that have long been the province of the upper castes.

Relationships between Dalits and Non-Dalits

We have been building from private consumption issues that reflected and reinforced caste distinctions such as grooming and eating, to publicly symbolic events like weddings. We now move to relationships between the castes as reflected both in social occasions, such as other caste weddings in the village, as well as formerly caste-stratified activities such as lifting dead animals, midwifery, and inter-personal relationships. In this case, we use the household survey but since some of these questions are village-specific, the village enumerators also filled out information about the village from a combination of key respondents, dalit facilitators and discussions while in the village.

The survey asked households directly two questions about weddings of non-dalits in the village. One was about their own involvement – whether they attended the weddings of non-dalits (separately for sons and daughters). A second question was if "in the village" dalits were seated separately at non-dalit weddings (asked separately for sons and daughters).⁷ These questions are related because people may have been willing to suffer the social humiliation of being seated separately at a wedding in the interests of either fulfilling a social obligation to be present or for engaging in the festivities, even on unequal terms.

The basic finding (Table 6, p 46) is that fewer dalits report attending non-dalit weddings, while at the same time, the practice of

Figure 3: Changes in the Use of Vehicles by the Groom's Party in Dalit Weddings (1990-2007)




Table 6: Changes in Caste-Related Social Practices (1990-2007, in %)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)		
	1990	2007	Change	1990	2007	Change
Dalits not seated separately at non-dalit weddings of grooms in the village	22.7	91.1	68.4	26.9	82.1	55.2
Attend non-dalit weddings of grooms	75.6	51.3	-24.3	38.3	16.1	-22.2
[E] Non-dalits visiting dalit homes eat/drink snacks/tea/water if offered ^b	1.7	72.5	70.8	3.6	47.8	44.2
[E] Births of dalit babies in the village are midwifed equally by dalits and non-dalits	1.1	89.9	88.8	1.8	4.4	2.6
[E] Government and non-dalit midwives come to dalit homes to deliver babies ^b	3.4	53.4	50.0	0.0	3.6	3.6
[E] Only dalits lift dead animals	19.1	0.6	-18.5	72.6	5.3	-67.3
[E] Dalits do not mortgage jewellery to non-dalits in distress situations	24.2	70.7	46.5	35.4	78.8	43.4
Most or all children go to school	28.8	63.4	34.6	21.7	65.7	44.0
Most or all girl children go to school	10.0	58.7	48.7	6.8	56.9	50.1

[E] This question was answered by the enumerator about the village; b "often" or "always".
Source: Authors' calculations.

separate seating of dalits at weddings, which had begun to erode by 1990 had been substantially eliminated by 2007. (Already by 1990, a quarter to a fifth of villages had eliminated separate seating.) In the eastern block, only 9% of dalits report that their villages still had separate seating of dalits at weddings, either "often" or "always", while the figure was 18% in the western block (see Figure 4).

Poverty and dependence might explain why more dalits attended non-dalit weddings in 1990, even though separate seating was more a norm then. By 2007, though such humiliation had become rare, fewer dalits were keen on attending non-dalit weddings. It is a mark of dalits' new-found independence – both from upper castes and the food in their feasts.

Many other dimensions of social practices have also seen impressive improvement as recorded by the survey enumerators.⁸ As of 1990, it was almost unheard of for non-dalits to accept drinks or snacks if they visited dalit households (2% and 4%, respectively in the eastern and western blocks), which, in a culture of hospitality, excludes dalits from reciprocal relationships. By 2007, in almost three-quarters of villages in the eastern block (72.5%) and nearly a half (47.8%) in the western block, non-dalits would accept drinks or food on visits.

Another traditional practice was that only dalits would lift the dead animals of the non-dalits. Enumerators recorded whether dead animals of non-dalits were lifted by "only dalits", "mainly non-dalits", "equally" or by "no one". In the western block, in 1990, in three-quarters of the villages (72.6), only dalits lifted the dead animals of non-dalits. By 2007, this was only true of 5% of villages. Interestingly in the eastern block, this transition appears to have happened earlier, with only 19% reporting "only


dalits" even in 1990; the practice had almost disappeared (0.6%) by 2007.

The births of dalit babies were traditionally never handled by non-dalit midwives and in 1990, it was extremely rare for this to happen. By 2007, in the eastern block, it was reported that in 90% of villages, these were handled by dalit and non-dalit midwives equally. However, this particular transition does not seem to have happened in the western block yet.

Another common practice among dalit households in these areas was the mortgaging of wedding jewellery during times of financial distress. Traditionally, this transaction with a non-dalit creditor would place dalits in an adverse financial position that reinforced their socially discriminated status, especially since land, labour and credit markets tended to be interlinked (see for example, Bardhan 1980). Again, over this period, this practice has become much less common. Households not resorting to this practice in the eastern block increased from 24.2% in 1990 to 70.7% in 2007. The corresponding figures for the western block are 35.4% and 78.8%.

Finally, the question of schooling of children is a complex decision. Schooling choice is in part an economic decision about preparing children for a future occupation, but it is also very strongly a social decision and signal about a child's place in society.⁹ There

Figure 4: Changes in Separate Seating at Village Weddings of Sons of Non-Dalits (1990-2007)



were significant improvements in the number of households reporting sending most or all of their children to school in both blocks, particularly among girls, where more than half of all households report having shifted to the practice of sending girls to school over this period from less than 10% earlier.

Changes in Occupation and Economic Relationships

The final domain of caste-related practice we examine is the pattern of economic activity. Caste has always been associated with occupation. Here again, we see large three changes during this

period. First, there is a significant shift of dalits into non-caste traditional occupations. Second, and related to the first, there has been significant migration of dalits into cities, leading to circular flows of members of dalit households between the rural and urban areas. Third, there have been major shifts in the practice of agriculture as dalits are increasingly less likely to work the fields of the traditional landlords. Instead, with the mechanisation of agriculture and hence decline of bullocks, dalits are becoming sharecroppers, cultivating upper-caste lands and increasingly hiring upper-caste men to till the land by tractors, shifting the nexus of contracting relationships. This is not to say the market is free of discrimination against dalits. Several studies have shown that in the formal private sector, there appears to be discrimination. But changes in market opportunities have allowed shifts in the economic occupation of dalits, of which this survey captures the implications for rural areas.

Expansion of Dalits into Non-Traditional Occupations

Households were asked whether the household “depended” on any of a variety of activities in 2007 and 1990. Over this relatively short period, half or more of households had added someone working as a migrant, in a profession, or in business, so that by 2007, about four-fifths of dalit households in these two blocks had at least one family member, and sometimes more in one of these three activities. Even if we exclude migrants and just focus on the households with members who work locally in a profession, such as mason, tailor master, driver or in a business such as grocery, fruit/vegetable, paan shop, this increased to 48% of households in the eastern block and 78.8% of households in the western block.

Table 7: Changes in Economic Activities (1990-2007, in %)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)		
	1990	2007	Change	1990	2007	Change
Depend on members who have migrated to urban centres	14.5	50.5	36.0	6.1	28.6	22.5
Any household member works locally as mason/tailor master/driver	14.0	37.0	23.0	9.3	42.1	32.9
Depend on business	4.2	11.0	6.8	6.0	36.7	30.8
At least one member doing one of the three	30.9	78.4	47.5	19.4	80.2	60.8
Government job	7.2	6.8	-0.4	5.0	7.3	2.4
Depend on your land	16.6	28.4	11.9	50.5	67.6	17.1
Sharecropping	16.7	31.4	14.7	4.9	11.4	6.5
Have a tube well	2.5	6.8	4.4	5.9	18.3	12.4
At least one of the above (government job, land, sharecrop, tube well)	32.0	57.2	25.2	51.9	69.9	18.0
Any member halwaha	32.1	1.1	-31.0	1.6	0.2	-1.4
Any member does agricultural labour	76.0	45.6	-30.4	46.1	20.5	-25.6

Source: Authors' calculations.

Migration

Migration has clearly been a powerful engine of dalit empowerment. The legal proscription on bonded labour from 1976 and the gradual demise of the halwaha system (discussed below) meant that the economic and social institutions that had rendered dalit labour unfree, became less binding. We believe an important indirect effect of India's robust economic growth has been the growth of opportunities in the urban informal sector, leading to a considerable increase in (mostly) circular migration to distant

cities for work. This has resulted in tightening labour supply in the villages, and financial flows to households from migrant members, enhancing the bargaining power of dalit households within the village economy and weakening traditional clientelist political structures.¹⁰

The survey provided a roster of those who were part of the household, but living away. Clearly in the more remote and less economically integrated eastern block, there was more outward movement, with 52.8% of households in the eastern block having at least one member living outside the village compared to only 13.5% in the western block (Table 8). Comparing Table 7 to Table 8, one can see many more households in the western block relying on a migrant than reporting an absent household member, suggesting shorter-term migration to closer urban areas.

Table 8: Numbers of Members of the Household Not Living with the Household, by Block (2007)

Number of Household Members Living Outside	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)		Western Block (Bulandshahar District)	
	Number of Households	Percentage	Number of Households	Percentage
0	4,322	47.2	8,580	86.5
1	2,622	28.6	573	5.8
2	997	10.9	262	2.6
3	414	4.5	134	1.4
4	229	2.5	154	1.6
5	188	2.1	95	0.96
6+	382	4.2	119	1.2
	9,154	100	9,917	100.0

Source: Survey data.

Changes in Agriculture

In addition to migration to cities for jobs, and shifts out of agriculture, even in rural areas, there are three major shifts *within* the pattern of agricultural activity, all of which have some connection with traditional caste practices. First, the decline of bullock use for ploughing has led to the near extinction of the halwaha relationship. Second, the advent of tractors for ploughing means that upper-caste men now plough the land of dalits themselves on a cash transaction basis. Third, there has been a rise in dalits engaged in sharecropping.

The practice of halwaha, in which a dalit household would provide for, among other services, full-time care of bullocks owned by upper-caste landlord has essentially disappeared from these blocks. Jagjivan Ram, probably the most powerful dalit Congress leader in the 1960s and 1970s, had this to say about this practice (Paswan and Jaideva 2002:83):

Ninety per cent of our people are agricultural labourers – rather agricultural serfs. If you have to see remnants of slavery you go to a village and see a *halwaha*. For a few rupees he is forced to mortgage himself to a *kisan* and serve him on mere subsistence allowance...These *halwahas* are not free to go over to other villages on higher wages.

The practice had already begun to wane in the 1970s and 1980s. It was essentially gone from the western block even by 1990,¹¹ but a third of households were in a halwaha relationship in 1990 in the eastern block. By 2007, the practice had essentially disappeared in the western and also in the eastern block (Table 7).

Second, there has been a considerable *rise* in sharecropping by dalits. In the eastern block in 2007, 31% of households had someone engaged in sharecropping. This is somewhat less true in the

western block, where the proportion of sharecropping doubled, but only from 4.9% to 11.4%. The reasons for this are undoubtedly complex but one likely explanation is that with greater economic opportunities, and freed from the entanglements of inter-linked labour and credit markets, dalits simply refuse to work as agricultural labourers on upper-caste land. This means that either the landlords have to farm the land themselves or they choose to sharecrop the land with dalits under contract.

This rise in sharecropping, together with the rise in the fraction of those who report depending on their own land, is associated with a sharp drop in the fraction of dalit households engaged as agricultural labourers. This is substantiated by data reported in Table 7. In the eastern block, the number of households with any member working as agricultural labour declined from 76% in 1990 to 45.6% in 2007 whereas, in the western block, the corresponding numbers are 46.1% in 1990 and 20.5% in 2007.¹²

Third, there has been a substantial shift in the eastern block towards dalits *renting in* ploughing services, now usually performed by upper-caste men themselves. In 1990, the practice of upper-caste men driving their own tractors to plough dalit lands themselves was prevalent in only 5% of the villages in the eastern block. By 2007, this was the nearly universal practice (98.3%). In contrast, this practice was already widespread in the western block (Table 9) – 96.5% in 1990 and 100% in 2007.

Table 9: Changes in Who Ploughs Lands (1990-2007, in %)

	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)			Western Block (Bulandshahar District)		
	1990	2007	Change	1990	2007	Change
Upper-caste men plough their own land with tractors	7.3	97.8	90.5	97.3	100.0	2.7
Dalit land ploughed by tractors owned by upper-caste men	18.5	98.9	80.4	95.6	100.0	4.4
Dalit land ploughed by upper-caste men driving their own tractors	5.0	98.3	93.3	96.5	100.0	3.5

Source: Authors' calculations.

Conclusion: Freedom from Social Inequality as Development

The results of this unique survey reveal very substantial shifts in dalits' lives, consistent with a growing sense of empowerment and opportunity and declining ability of others to impose social inequalities. Changes in grooming and eating are both consistent with a deliberate attempt to shed consumption patterns that

reflect and reproduce social exclusion and inferiority, through the rapid adoption of "elite" consumption patterns – much faster than can be explained by economic variables alone. Traditional stratifications in social life within the village have also rapidly eroded. No one would argue that dalits have achieved anything like equality, but it is certainly the case that many practices that reflected social subordination and routine humiliation of dalits have declined considerably. In a large majority of the villages in this survey, dalits no longer lift non-dalits' dead animals; dalit babies are often delivered by non-dalit midwives; dalits are rarely seated separately at weddings; and it is no longer uncommon for non-dalits to accept foods in dalit homes. Economically, there has been a rapid shift out of traditional dalit economic relationships into local occupations and professions, migration and changed agricultural practices.

This is not to suggest that caste has disappeared as a social construct. It is very much alive. Nor is this to suggest that there are not still tensions and atrocities. But rather than viewing atrocities as a sign of unchanged repression, Chakraborty, Babu, and Chakravorty (2006) show that the atrocities themselves could be the result of the very rapid improvements for dalits which unsettle existing relationships.

Our analysis suggests that for the surveyed dalits, the description of the market reform era should come with an "and", not a "but". Prosperity raised the standard of living *and* the social and cultural fabric of the village has changed, much for the better. Debates about the effects of economic reforms on inequality in India based on changes in consumption inequality have so far completely missed these much larger changes in social and cognitive inequality. The good life, as Hegel argued, is fundamentally dependent on being held in high regard by others. Approval and recognition are crucial to this. The arrival of modernity in western societies ruptured existing social hierarchies, replacing them with a universal language (even if not practice) of dignity and self-respect. In India, questions of dignity, self-respect and humiliation were at the core of the nationalist discourse. But as Gopal Guru (2009a: 4) has perceptively argued, while Indian nationalists were deeply cognizant of the racial humiliations resulting from colonisation, they were much less aware of caste-based humiliations. Thus Indian nationalism was "Janus-faced" – externally radical but internally conservative. This was

Table 10: Summary of Changes Reported by Dalits in Social and Economic Spheres (1990-2007)

Domain of Social Change	Example(s)	Eastern Block (Azamgarh District)					Western Block (Bulandshahar District)				
		1990 (%)	2007 (%)	Change (%)	Ratio of Change to Maximum Previous Change	Change at Same Assets % (1990 Average)	1990 (%)	2007 (%)	Change (%)	Ratio of Change to Maximum Previous Change	Change at Same Asset % (1990 Average)
Grooming	Uses toothpaste	2.2	53.6	51.4	23.4	34	2.9	82.3	79.4	27.4	63
Eating	Does not eat roti chatni for lunch	18.4	97.8	79.4	4.3	78	18.3	90.9	72.6	4.0	66
Sociability	Car/jeep transport groom's party to bride's village	33.8	99.4	65.6	1.9	65	2.5	98.8	96.3	38.5	95
Caste barriers	Dalits not seated separately at non-dalit weddings	22.7	91.1	68.4	3.0	66	26.9	82.1	55.2	2.0	50
	Non-dalits accept food	1.7	72.5	70.8	65.1		4.1	62.6	58.5	14.3	
Occupation in villages	Work locally as mason/tailor/driver	14.0	37.0	23.0	1.6		9.3	42.1	32.9	3.5	
	Depend on business	4.2	11.0	6.8	1.6		6.0	36.7	30.8	5.1	
Migration to cities	HH member migrated to urban centres?	14.5	50.5	36.0	2.5		6.1	28.6	22.5	3.7	
Agriculture	Upper caste men plough dalit land themselves	5.0	98.3	93.3	15.5		96.7	100.0	3.5	0.0	
Consumer goods	Bicycle	46.6	84.1	37.5	0.8		37.7	83.7	46.0	1.2	

Source: Summary from tables and figures above.

something Ambedkar (1979: 263) clearly saw in Congressmen when he called them “political radicals and social Tories”.¹³

We stress not over-interpreting these results. As the experience of caste is localised, our results certainly do not speak to anything like all of India.¹⁴ However, even if we limit the implications of our study just to the state of UP, there are roughly 32 million dalits just in UP, which is comparable to the scope of civil rights for African-Americans in the United States, where the “black alone” population in 2004 was 36 million, or the end of apartheid in South Africa, where the “black” population is roughly 38.4 million.

Moreover, in the present research, we make no attempt to distinguish among the potential driving *causes* of these shifts by disentangling the political (the rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in UP), economic (market-oriented reforms and rapid growth), exogenous social (for example, exposure to media), or technological (introduction of tractors and irrigation) explanations. What needs emphasis is that during this period, as per their own self-assessment, the social well-being of large numbers of dalits advanced even faster than their material well-being. Certainly this additional human freedom should count as an “and” in assessing the achievements of the market-reform era.

NOTES

- 1 These remarks were made at the Constituent Assembly Debates in 1948 (Ambedkar 1994).
- 2 Total household consumption reported through the National Sample Survey is only about half of the national accounts measure of the same concept (Deaton 2000). The most telling example of such misreporting came in an instance when as the enumerators were being told how poor the household was, it dawned on the local facilitator that this family was arranging for their son to marry the facilitator's cousin. As soon as the facilitator mentioned this, the household head's incentives changed dramatically from understatement of assets to overstatement. The respondent insisted the enumerators tear up the survey instrument they had just filled out, admitting he had been less forthcoming to them because he was worried about losing his benefits, and insisted they fill out a new form with all new answers.
- 3 Due to space constraints in publication, we show only one indicator for each section, but the graphs for all variables are available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/lpritch/>
- 4 Since our survey was carried out in the early months of 2008, we use 2007 for the purposes of end-year for these computations.
- 5 We are not proposing this as a general India-wide answer to the calorie puzzle, since our evidence applies at best only to dalits and only to UP.
- 6 This does mean that in the figure, the “predicted” method for predicting behaviour at 1990 levels of wealth means that since there is no asset gradient the prediction is that (nearly everyone) would have done this at median wealth in 1990. This illustrates the enormity of the shift.
- 7 Although asked separately about sons and daughters, the answers to these questions were nearly identical so we report only findings for weddings of sons, since these usually remain in the village.
- 8 The averages reported in the tables are data from enumerators but merged into the household file, thus attributing the village characteristic to each household. So these are the equivalent of “Dalit household weighted” village averages, not the raw village averages.
- 9 The economics of schooling and caste are complex in India because caste and occupation are intertwined. There are two points. First, much of the economic return to education comes from the fact that people make higher wages when educated. However, most of this return comes from children entering into occupations different than their parents. It is well documented around the world that the returns to schooling for those who remain farmers are quite low, especially where farming is not particularly dynamic. Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) show that the returns to basic education were zero in the regions of India that were technologically stagnant. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) find that even in Mumbai, the strength of caste occupational ties influence education decisions so that boys in castes with strong occupational links go to local language schools. Some of the increase in schooling could

- be an increase in perceived returns as parents no longer anticipate their children will remain in occupations with low returns, which is both a social and economic shift.
- 10 The effects of financial remittances in weakening traditional patron-client relations in villages are likely to become significant as migration increases. For evidence based on a survey of Bihar villages, see Kapur and Witsoe (2010).
 - 11 This is confirmed by a small survey of 50 agriculture labour households in three villages in eastern UP that was done in 1991-92. The survey found that the practice of halwaha had disappeared in the early 1990s (Shankar 1993).
 - 12 The survey instrument asked, “Does any member of the household work as a landless agricultural labourer?” This conflates “landless” and agricultural labour. The close concordance of the occupational and activity questions suggests both are referring to this type of labour as a primary activity.
 - 13 Written Evidence before the Southborough Committee (paragraph 33) in Ambedkar (1979).
 - 14 For instance, a recent study in Gujarat finds that caste-based discrimination against dalits continues to be pervasive (Navsarjan Trust and Robert F Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights 2010). However, unlike our survey, this study did not measure change. For dalits at least, there is unlikely to have been a halcyon past.

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