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THE INDIA-PAKISTAN-U.S. TRIANGLE

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with discussants
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A Distinguished International Scholar Lecture
Thursday, March 18, 2010

at the
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The Stephanie Grauman Wolf Room
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DEVESH KAPUR: Good evening. I'm Devesh Kapur, the Director of CASI, and I'd like to welcome you all to this evening. It's a great privilege to welcome Mr. Jaswant Singh, who all of you are very well aware of. I just learned that Mr. Jaswant Singh is now serving his eighth term in the Indian Parliament; I think there are just about a couple of people now in the Indian Parliament who have been serving for a longer term. He's had an incredibly distinguished career. He joined the Indian Army at the age of nineteen and served in two wars. Amongst other things, he's had the rare privilege of serving as India's foreign minister, its finance minister, and also its defense minister. While he has been in Parliament, serving the Indian government, he has also – and this is sort of embarrassing for me as an academic – he has written eighteen books on the way, in English, in Hindi, and in Rajasthani dialect. And while doing all of these things, he's also managed to be president of the Indian Polo Association, which I particularly like. This evening, he will be sharing his thoughts on this conundrum of South Asia and the India-Pakistan-U.S. triangle.

We are also very privileged to have two commentators who have deep experience in this area: Francine Frankel, who many of you know, is a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and she was the founding director of CASI and also the UPenn Center in New Delhi. She is the author or editor of eight books, and her current book manuscript is particularly germane to our discussions, which is, she has been working on a book called *Foreign Policy Making in India and the United States During the Nehru Years*. Our second discussant is Bruce Riedel, who is a Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution. He retired in 2006 after thirty years service in the CIA. He was a senior

advisor to the last four Presidents of the U.S. on South Asia and the Middle East. Most recently, he was asked by President Barack Obama to chair a review of U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. So, I welcome you all.

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: Thank you Devesh, my distinguished fellow discussants, ladies and gentlemen. I am somewhat intimidated by the introduction that Devesh has provided to you. At times it is difficult for me to recognize myself. You discussed, Devesh, of the conundrum…which is the conundrum? The first one we are going to start with becomes…though the subject for this evening, spelled out, speaks only of the United States, India, and Pakistan, in reality, unless the we simultaneously address the challenge of Afghanistan, we cannot, even satisfactorily, address what Devesh, quite rightly, in that sense, called the conundrum.

I will try to do justice to a complex subject, which is one of the most challenging issues that confronts the world today, in a time frame of about twenty minutes, so that thereafter there are two other very experienced and learned discussants who will throw light on the subject, and we must have adequate time for questions and answers so that the whole discussion becomes interactive.

So, what we are discussing this evening, as well as we can in the time, is really not a triangle relationship between the three countries, and it's also not a rectangle (because there is the People's Republic of China), it is a kind of quandary that we actually examine it in the situation.

I would like to share – this afternoon I was with Devesh and I was reflecting in my mind as to where to start – I want to share a date with you ladies and gentlemen, the date is 1492, and it's in that year that Christopher Columbus landed in the United States of America. I quite often wonder if he hadn't landed, if Christopher Columbus had actually not arrived in America, where would America be now? Also, because Columbus landed here in 1492, you have a variety of Indians who are born in the American continent – you have Canadian Indians, you have American Indians, and Mexican Indians, and Peruvian Indians, all of them are Indians – and then you have *Indian* Indians. So when we reflect on the question of India, this is one date that quite often comes to mind, and the other is when the United States talks of democracy and introducing or promoting democracy, what comes to mind is December 16, 1773. I see a lot of perplexed faces. December 16, 1773 is the Boston Tea Party. Now, the Boston Tea Party has a history, as to why was tea, in any case, brought to Boston that December. Because the East India Company had gone bankrupt – East India Company was a British company – and because they had gone bankrupt, the British Parliament enacted a law that tea would be imported free of duty, and then brought to the United States of America. So, in a sense, what Philadelphia has – you have Independence Hall, you have the Liberty Bell, you have the Constitution Center – somewhere there is a linkage with India, which goes back to Christopher Columbus, all these events, even to the introduction of the freedom movement, vote against the British, and democracy. That is the essence and reality, ladies and gentlemen, of the fundamentals of an Indo-U.S. linkage. I had the distinction, the great privilege, of serving Prime Minister Vajpayee in some capacities, and there is a memorable phrase he had used, during one of his visits here, when he termed India and the United States of America as natural allies. It is true, this is not a

hyperbolic phrase; it is not an exaggeration. India and the United States of America – of course we are divided by language, you speak American and we speak English, but between those two there are great similarities. We are able to laugh at the same jokes, we are persuaded by the same concerns, and we have commitments that don't have to be explained to each other. And I think, in that sense, for me to spend more time on Indo-U.S. relations would in fact be superfluous. I was very struck because on one occasion – Bruce can update me on the statistics of it – it was President Clinton, if I'm not mistaken, who shared that there were about eighty-three nationalities in the United States of America, and of those eighty-three nationalities, the annual census of how each of the nationalities is performing, and he said that during the last five years they have found that students from India have scored at the highest level, socially they are the most integrated, and a fraction of Indian citizens who are now not just residents but citizens of this great country, they are owning as much as six to eight percent of U.S. wealth. And what is remarkable is that so many of those American Indians – or should they be Indian-Americans? – so many of them are actually now willing and ready to go back to India. This kind of reverse flow of talent from the United States of America back to India is really another aspect of Indo-U.S. relations, which I found most interesting.

I don't want to go into the phases of Indo-U.S. relations, because the substance has been a natural alliance. And there have been phases in the relationship between India and the United States of America. In the early phases, when the Cold War had descended and frozen the globe into two blocks – those phases of Christian minorities and Dalits – that period of contention, even then, the aspect of natural allies, to my mind, always remained. And then we had a phase, post-'98, when we recognized – both India and the

United States of America recognized – that it was very necessary for the two countries to begin to live and work together. And that is the other part of the Indo-U.S. relations. And there is a degree of confusion here, a degree of confusion because U.S. acquaintance with India is a post-1947 phenomenon, not a pre-1947 phenomenon. Pre-1947, before the independence or partition of India, the United States of America had virtually delegated its relationship with the Indian subcontinent to the imperial British, and it's only post-1947 that the United States began to assert its own concerns in the subcontinent. There occurs the first divide, which will lead me on to Pakistan and Afghanistan. And that divide is a divide that was not really appreciated, understood, or even examined by the British who were withdrawing, by the United States of America who was already a dominant power then, because the U.S. became the global power, militarily and also industrially, effectively from the First World War onward. Post-1947, no assessment was carried out, either by the Freedom Movement or those that led the Freedom Movement. The departing British did have an assessment, and there is really quite a telling appreciation of the withdrawal of Britain from the Indian subcontinent, which is what South Asia was then called, and there was a commission by the British government to carry out that appreciation, and, ladies and gentlemen, even at the cost of being charged with promoting my own book, this appreciation is part of the work on Jinnah which, I hope, will shortly be on sale. But this appreciation for the first time speaks of the importance of the western frontiers of India and the eastern frontiers of India. But there was another consequence of the Cold War, and the consequence was the freezing of the globe in two blocks, and the partition of India, which Gandhi used to call the vivisection, that partition of India put Pakistan into one section of the globe – one part of the globe – and India in the other, with the result that the relationships

between these two countries are frozen into animosities. It is another sad aspect of the unintended consequences of history that that part of the partition was not appreciated and not taken into account.

On Pakistan, as I said, Pakistan and India are born of the same womb, but it was not a natural birth, it was a Caesarean section. It was a Caesarean section that was actually done by the departing British. One of the myths is that it was a peaceful transfer of power, which it was not. It was one of the most violent transfers that the world had witnessed. There is no real authority that can inform us as to how many died. Estimates vary between thirteen to fifteen million people died, and many more millions were uprooted. It was without a doubt the most traumatic event of the twentieth century for the subcontinent. It is astonishing for me, when I reflect on the fact – please correct me, distinguished professors, as to the details – that every year there are about fifteen to twenty books written on the American Civil War. And it's one of those strange conundrums, Devesh, that the Partition of India, after the early outpouring of pain and poetry, there is very little. It's also a curious aspect that this most traumatic event, which influences the entire situation in South Asia today, continues to be a subject of non-inquiry. I don't want to speak of my book here, but I was struck by the fact – and I hate to say this in first person, ladies and gentlemen, but I don't know how else to say it – I am the only Member of Parliament of India in the last fifty-eight years that has written a book on Jinnah. Why? And not a single member from Pakistan National Assembly who has written about Jinnah. And I quite often reflect on this, and I'll share with you what I think. Because this great tragedy of partition and great deaths that took place, the British did not leave because it was an act of great altruism or statesmanship,

the British left the subcontinent because they were tired, they were finished; it was an exhausted Great Britain that had lost its manpower, that had lost its money, that had lost its will. There is a very moving letter that Field Marshall **[inaudible]** wrote to His Majesty, the King summing up what he described as the reason why Great Britain must leave, and he says that the only reason we could govern India was moral authority, now we no longer have that moral authority, and there is a wonderful untranslatable Urdu word for it – I don't know if it is Urdu or Farsi in origin – the word is "ekbar." I have to say this in vernacular and try and translate it after that. In 1857 it used to be said, **[Urdu quotation]** it used to be said that the East India Company has lost its moral authority. If a government loses its moral authority – any kind of government: monarchical, dictatorial, electoral – it is finished. And the British Government had lost its "ekbar" in 1947; they had to leave.

Of that great event, and the birth of Pakistan, there are two or three conclusions that I come to, which I leave only as conclusions before I go to Afghanistan, very briefly. And that is what, Devesh, the conundrum lies, quite often, in politics and international relations, as in personal life, paradoxes resolve the conundrums. One of the paradoxes; that a country founded for Islam, in the name of Islam, to define Islam as the greatest challenge and problem. Pakistan is challenged by Islam, and, I tell you, my friends from Pakistan reflect on this, because unless you reflect on the original mistake – the original mistake was Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who put across the thesis that Muslims are a separate nation, which is an absurdity. They are not a separate nation; they are part of the Indian nation. And I wholeheartedly believed – and I'm not the original thinker of

that – I believe that the true renaissance of Islam is possible only in India (but that's a separate thesis).

So, one problem, and I'll just define it now, is that Islam has today become the problem of Pakistan. How much more ironic can you get? I used to speak, I lived, and I had responsibility, that Pakistan had become the crucible of terrorism. It's much more than a crucible of terrorism because it has now become the center of gravity of global uncertainty. If you reflect, ladies and gentlemen, on how the center of gravity of global challenges moved from the West to the East post World War II, you'll find that the first movement was to what we call the Gulf area, Palestine and Israel, which remains but is not so much; it has moved further West. Close to the collapse of the Soviet Union there was an apprehension that the center of gravity of instability would go into central Asia, Islamic republics; it didn't. It is the misfortune of the Indian subcontinent – South Asian subcontinent – that that center of gravity of instability is today focused on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The third point that I wish to leave here – and here, again, it's an ironic thing – Pakistan was founded, and the earlier appreciation by the British and everybody was that Pakistan would be the protector of Western national interests, from the beginning. Hence, from about the middle of the fifties you find that Pakistan begins…I won't go into the history of the evolution of all those things, but Pakistan continued to be the protector and guardian of Western national interests because that was where the Western national interests of the frontiers lay. It is ironic that a very distinguished diplomat of the United States of America, a former secretary of state with whom I had the great pleasure of working, she called Pakistan an international migraine. That

couldn't be more apt, perhaps a more critical definition. This is the third point. For Islam, a country is created and Islam becomes the problem. The Western world wants Pakistan as the bastion, protector of its national interests, and Pakistan becomes the greatest challenger to Western national interests and the center of gravity from where, earlier, the crucible of terrorism, the center of gravity of global instability is now there.

And that brings me to Afghanistan. This is a great challenge. I will be very brief about Afghanistan for a few reasons: one is that it's a subject by itself, two is that it was not part of the definition of the original, three because I would much rather answer questions and not talk all the time. Please remember one or two aspects: What is it that King Zahir Shah was doing so that there was a secular, a stable, and a peaceful Afghanistan, and what is it that has happened subsequently. We should reflect on that. What is it that the Saur Revolution did which so disturbed Afghanistan that it is in this situation? The third question that I ask is what is it, what is the mistake that the successors to the czar, the authority which at the time in the twentieth century was the greatest empire, what is it that they did wrong, and what is it that the greatest power on earth today is doing which is committing the same mistake as the Soviet Union had? These are some of the questions that arise.

I would like to conclude, so far as Afghanistan is concerned, what is on an anecdotal basis, which is autobiographical, is the second conclusion. I had the unenviable task of recovering an airplane of the Indian alliance that had been hijacked and flown from Katmandu, eventually, to a Taliban-held Kandahar, and that was an interesting experience, it was – the millenium was changing, it was December 24th to December 31st – it's a long story. The aircraft was recovered, the passengers were safely back. I went

back to Jodhpur, the city where I am from (I am not from Jodhpur proper), and the headlines in the local newspaper were – there was an earlier Maharaja of Jodhpur called Maharaja Jaswant Singh, and he had actually conquered Kandahar – so there was one Jaswant Singh who had conquered Kandahar, and there is this Jaswant Singh who is lost in Kandahar.

So, I would like to leave you with a thought, that you can occupy Afghanistan but you cannot conquer Afghanistan. That is the difference. There is also another thought I'd like to leave you with: unless you recognize that artificial constructs, given the name of countries, wherever in this region, will not easily absorb either Western-style democracy or what you want them to be through elections or such things. Let the native genius of South Asia assert himself. Let us try to find answers to ourselves. Finally, unless the United States of America is able to spell out "Victory is equal to what," we hear remarks, comments that the United States must win, I do also believe that the United States must win, but what is that which will make you win, and what is that which will make you say we are now victorious? And if that is defined, debate will always wonder about exit policy. Afghanistan is not, Devesh, part of the trio, but the subject would not have been complete. I have overstepped my time, but I think the political community to which I belong have a tendency, once they are given a microphone, to keep speaking. Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen.

BRUCE RIEDEL: Thank you, Devesh, for your very kind introduction. This is a hard act to follow. Thinking about this, I probably should have said "regrets, I can't make it." It's a real honor to be on the same platform as Jaswant Singh, someone who I've had the

privilege of knowing now for, I think, almost two decades. I was a player in his dialogue with Strobe Talbott at the end of the last century, which is one of the masterpieces of diplomacy and should be a case study for people for years to come, and I love to hear insights like "the crucible of terror" when they're first thought up, I think. And to watch as the United States and India began on a voyage to a village, as Jaswant Singh described it, which turned out to be a voyage to the relationship to the relationship the United States and India have now, tremendously transformed from what it was twenty years ago, and with hopefully even more to come in years ahead. It's also an honor to be here back at CASI, with Devesh and Francine. I've been associated with this institution now for also quite a long time, and it's a pleasure to be here.

I'm going to focus on just one issue, of the many that came up, and that's the conundrum of how the United States and India think about Pakistan. I think Jaswant Singh and I come to almost all of the same conclusions. I'm going to take it one step further and talk about some policy recommendations of how we might go forward. I'm going to leave Afghanistan for questions later on.

India and the United States have many, many important issues on their bilateral agenda, but I think at the top of the issues is the fact that we both share an interest in resolving the problem of an unhealthy Pakistan. Pakistan today is an unhealthy state. There are lots of other terms you can use – "failing," "failed," "sick" – all of which have political charge in them, so I'll use a more neutral term, I hope. Pakistan today is undergoing severe distress. According to a Pakistani think tank, last year 25,000 Pakistanis were killed or wounded in acts of terrorism or in terrorism related violence. Five thousand were killed or wounded in suicide bombings. This is unprecedented. The

country has never seen something like this. The only thing that even compares is the 1971 break with east and west, but all that violence was in the east, not in the west. Pakistan, as Jaswant rightly said, is severely challenged by Islam today. The Frankenstein monster of jihadist environments that Pakistan helped to create over the course of the last three decades has now come home to haunt it and to attack in its cities, in Rawalpindi, in the heart of the Pakistani pentagon. It is indeed the crucible of terror – I call it the "epicenter of terror" – I think it's pretty much the same thing; it's the center of gravity. Pakistanis are reluctantly realizing that the jihadist monster they created now threatens them – not all of them by any means – but if you look at polling in Pakistan today, you'll see a fundamental change from a year ago. A year ago, Pakistanis were in denial: "we don't have a problem." When I chaired the President's strategic review of policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Pakistani interlocuters we dealt with at the highest level – the very highest level – particularly in the Pakistani army, denied that there was a problem in their country. A year later, some are still in denial, but it's pretty hard to deny when cities like Karachi and Lahore are regularly car-bombed.

It's ironic, because President Clinton, when he went to South Asia in 2000, during his four hour stop in Islamabad, said to President Musharraf, "terror will consume you if you continue on the path you're on." We have the satisfaction of knowing we were right, but that doesn't solve the problem today. And many of the parts of the jihadist Frankenstein continue to be nourished by the Pakistani state. Not only is the country under distress in this way, the country is under distress from economic problems, water problems, and trying to make the transition from dictatorship to democracy for the

fourth time. You have to believe in the triumph of hope over experience to believe it's going to do it. But we have a vital interest in doing it, we've seen what the military leadership does, that's how we got in the mess we're in. We've got to try to see if it can be done a different way. The United States and India share this problem. The one difference we have – it's a big difference – is that for us, it's a problem on the other side of the globe, for India it's a problem immediately next door. But it's a real problem for us as well. The mastermind of 9/11 watched the Twin Towers fall from Karachi. Terror comes to us from the crucible of terror.

What to do about it? Well, unfortunately, there's no simple solution. What the United States and India would like to try to do is change the strategic direction of the country. I'll oversimplify it: Pakistan, for many years, has been a patron state sponsor of terror, now it has become a patron state sponsor of terror and a victim of terror. Our goal is to move it to be only a victim and, ultimately, to be not a victim at all, to be a healthy Pakistan. It's easy to say; there's no simple way to get there. We've tried bribing Pakistan; it didn't work. We've tried sanctioning Pakistan; it hasn't worked. The policy that this administration has embarked upon is to try to engage, pressure, cajole, embarrass, shame – do whatever it can. There's no guarantee of success here at all. And meanwhile, the dark forces in Pakistan that have struck in the past may strike again. To prevent that, one of the things this administration has done has been an unprecedented degree of intelligence exchange with India, like nothing we have ever seen before. The director of Special Intelligence Leon Panetta's first foreign trip was to New Delhi, intentionally to send a message to Islamabad. The director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair is in New Delhi today. Another symbol of this was, of course,

the President's decision to hold the only state dinner of his first year in office with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to have serious and candid discussions.

Defense is good, but it's not sufficient. The odds of protecting and preventing another catastrophic terrorist incident are not in our favor. We have to be lucky every time. The dark forces only have to be lucky once again. And we need to start thinking about that in a very serious way. We need to have the kinds of conversations between leaders, like the conversations that Jaswant and Strobe held in the 1990s, about what we're going to do in certain scenarios, in certain contingencies. These are hard, these are hard things to contemplate. What will we do if there is another Mumbai? What will we do if there is another 9/11 that is postmarked Pakistan (that almost certainly will be the case, if there is another 9/11)? And on top, of course, is the fundamental reality; we're talking about a country with the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. Let me say that one more time: the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world. That's pretty chilling when you think about it.

My wife always urges me not to end on a down note, so I won't end on a down note, I'll end on an up note: book promotion. I've read it, it's a fantastic book. I'll admit why I read it: I wanted to find out what he said about Jinnah that was so offensive that his party would throw him out of office. I couldn't find it; maybe it's not in the English edition. There must be something in the other edition that is so offensive. I highly recommend it and I urge you all to read it. Thank you very much.

FRANCINE FRANKEL: Well, I am delighted to be here with my colleagues at CASI, Devesh Kapur, who succeeded me as Director, Bruce Riedel, who we know each other

through CASI, and of course our distinguished guest, Jaswant Singh and his distinguished wife.

I will change the direction and emphasis a little bit, by picking up some aspects of the India-U.S. relationship that is also relevant here. There are phrases used…Jaswant used a phrase that became very familiar of the U.S. and India being "natural allies." In my work on the Nehru papers, I was surprised that Nehru used a similar expression, that the U.S. and India were "natural friends." And we all know, as we look back, that this friendship somehow never came to fruition. Some of this, as Jaswant pointed out, is a long story, but I think Partition did play a very important role. And one element in that was the failure of the Indian leadership – and here, I think, Nehru in particular – to understand the geo-strategic consequences of Partition and Nehru's tendency, after Partition, to overestimate India's importance in the Southeast Asia-South Asia region, to the extent that he was willing to follow policies that ended up by completely alienating the United States. Certainly as early as the Korean War, the aftermath, and subsequently Vietnam, the notion took hold in Washington that India would never do anything for the United States, never give anything to the United States, and so there was no reason why the United States should be concerned about India's strategic interests or, for example, the decision to enter an alliance with Pakistan, because India was already so alienated from the United States, and the United States from India, that not too much more could happen. And India needed the United States for economic reasons so it would never totally break with the United States. I would say that the notion that, in fact, the U.S. and India are very good friends or natural friends or natural allies is in danger of being over, and that's also true today. It's a very dangerous

situation, I think, that's developing, even beyond what was described by Mr. Singh and Bruce Riedel.

There is, I think, a situation developing in which the stakes, in fact, are very high in Asia, that affect the whole power equilibrium. The Obama administration has created the impression, certainly, that the U.S. is more interested in China right now than it is interested in developing the partnership with India. And India is in a very fragile situation, I would say, being displaced as the main influential power in the region – in neighboring countries like Sri Lanka, Burma, Nepal, one could go on – by China. In this kind of situation, what is the United States doing? The United States is trying to curb India's role, particularly in Afghanistan, and say lower your profile in Afghanistan because this gets the Pakistanis upset and we need them to help fight the Taliban, the terrorists, and so on. I don't know, because I haven't been on the ground, but I understand that Pakistan will not allow India access to its territory to move humanitarian supplies into Afghanistan.

And so, the question is, what kind of friendship does the United States have with India? And we can make this very concrete, in a very short period, by pointing to what has happened to the Bush initiative for a strategic partnership with India. There is no doubt in my mind that when this was inaugurated, the strategic vision of our policy makers, both in Washington and New Delhi, was basically the same, and that strategic vision had to do with maintaining an equilibrium in Asia, to which India's cooperation was crucial, and that equilibrium was meant to prevent domination of Asia by China. And if we were to have extrapolated from the last months of the Bush administration, we would have assumed the next administration would have followed through on that vision. As it

happens, the Obama administration has not even taken the next steps in solidifying nuclear cooperation between India and the United States; it has continued, despite Pakistan's role as the center of terrorism, to keep hoping that giving Pakistan more economic assistance, more military assistance, is somehow going to persuade Islamabad to change its policy and do what we would like, which is to concentrate on terrorism inside Pakistan and, of course, in Afghanistan, *but* without insisting that Pakistan stop its support of terrorists, jihadists, for example, in Kashmir. But we want India to do something about Kashmir.

So this is, I think, a very unfortunate period in the U.S.-India relationship, and a lot of the achievements that we thought we had made during the Bush administration is being dissipated. And now, in both countries, the old arguments are coming back for why there can't be a close collaboration between India and the United States: India is not powerful enough, India cannot hold the balance, we've oversold India, we shouldn't alienate China, we shouldn't alienate Russia. And then in India I see the same kinds of sentiments resurfacing about not getting too close to the United States, the United States is too big, too overbearing, it will make India into a subordinate ally – I mean, the formulation usually is if the United States wants a strategic partnership with India that means that it is telling India what its position should be, so therefore, by definition, you lose your independence in making foreign policy.

So I would just highlight some of those issues – I realize it's a very big subject – because I think those have to be addressed between India and the United States before there can be any thought of cooperation between them that helps the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan to be resolved.

DEVESH KAPUR: We'll just now open it up for questions. A request: we want the questions to be short. I know some of you think that you know more than our panelists – I'm sure you do – but I think it will be nice if you allow the other guests to also ask questions. So I think what I'd like to do is to go around starting from the right and then go around this way, but please keep your questions short and very specific.

QUESTION: That was a very nice speech today. Putting your Defense Minister hat back on, and your CIA hat back on, you're going to have a very political answer, but, if the situation in Pakistan goes completely out of control and they have control over the nuclear power state, who is in more danger, East or West?

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: Who is in greater danger? I think, principally, Pakistan itself. That's the first country that will be in danger. And you must understand that if Afghanistan is in difficulty, Pakistan will be in difficulty, and if Pakistan is in difficulty, then India will have difficulties, without any doubt. So you are thinking of a Pakistan that has lost control of its nuclear assets, were that, heaven forbid, to happen then the country that would be most disturbed would be the United States of America.

BRUCE RIEDEL: I would agree. Fortunately, the scenario you described is neither imminent nor inevitable, while it is a real possibility. There is a worse scenario, which is it's a jihadist coup from within the army, and that's happened in Pakistan once, so it can happen again. If you want to talk about scary contingency planning, that's about as scary as I can think of.

QUESTION: Thank you so much. I just had a question regarding the paradox that you put forth in terms of Islam being the greatest challenge to Pakistan today. Where do you think that comes from? Is that a result of Partition and the rhetoric used in Partition, or is that a result of the politicians that Pakistan has had as leaders trying to push Islam as a form of legitimacy?

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: Where does it come from is a question that really is best answered by Pakistan. And Pakistan has studied the subject and because it is a challenge to India too. I refer to a press conference that Muhammad Ali Jinnah held in New Delhi in November 1946. He was asked this question, and it was remarkable that he spoke of a relationship between India and Pakistan that would be stronger than any existing doctrine. It was quoted. And his speech in the assembly of Pakistan, where he said you are free to pursue whatever your religion was…it is very difficult for me to explain those. I come from a part of India where we had no consciousness of Partition, so it wasn't as if, uniformly, all over India the same sentiment pervaded. Where did this happen? Muhammad Ali Jinnah died within thirteen months of Pakistan being born, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated, and three or four of the successive Prime Ministers are unable to, thereafter the descent into greater and greater extremism perhaps are an inevitability. And then for Pakistan to lend itself as a proxy state and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the creation of the Taliban was, after all, a giant U.S.-Pakistani effort. These were a slow progression of extremism, and we are very lucky that it hasn't become more extreme than that, but I think Pakistan is to reflect upon its connections rather than…news just broke of the late General Zia. General Zia's takeover of Pakistan

was a coup by an extremist, and General Zia turned Pakistan into an extremist state.

QUESTION: Hi everybody. I'd just like to have a question for you, that, as a democratic citizen of India, I sometimes feel that, okay, we are discussing some policies which we have to make, that some bunch of people can make decisions, but as a citizen of India I feel that I should have a say in the decision-making process of the country. I mean, if some tragedy happens somewhere, there are a very small bunch of people who make decisions very quickly. I know there is not a simple solution for that, but it doesn't matter, we are discussing policies here, but ultimately what happens, a bunch of people, I mean, there is no longer a difference between a totalitarian state and a democratic state, in my opinion.

DEVESH KAPUR: Would you be very specific with regard to your question?

QUESTION: Okay, what is your view on that?

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: No, you're right, you're right, it's not...it gets distilled to a few big decisions that influence me, I agree. I have sympathy for your sense of frustration. When you say what is the solution, I recommend strongly don't take to politics. Try to influence the situation by giving voice to your thoughts, your fears, your apprehensions, but don't take up politics.

QUESTION: Sir, I have two very short modest questions, one to the Honorable Jaswant Singh. I've heard that when President Musharraf visited Agra in that summit, he addressed Mr. Vajpayee as his father and he said let's get this down for the sake of future generations and then the whole deal fell through. So if you were in the middle of all this, would you kindly say what really happened? That's my first question.

The second short question is both to Francine and Bruce. There is no such thing called "natural allies." It has to be cultivated, negotiated, pampered. Now, the U.S., with all its accolades of Indian Americans, they are still not sending an Indian American ambassador. They have done it in Latin America, they've done it in Europe and other countries. Now, we could start with Francine Frankel, who has this tremendous understanding of both sides' interests. So I will ask you to comment on this, thank you.

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: Yes, I was involved in talks in Agra. I think what went wrong was the breakfast press conference that General Musharraf held. The press and the media is a very heady wine, and it goes quickly to your head, and the press and the media had made so much of General Musharraf in the morning television interviews, etc., and naturally, because he was a news item. It was an error of judgment on his part. If you recollect, the decision to invite him to India was taken despite Kargil, despite Kandahar, despite the attack on the assembly in Jammu and Kashmir and the attack on Indian Parliament. And when Prime Minister Vajpayee – we were at lunch, he and I, and he asked me, "Are you due to visit Srinager then?" Musharraf had taken over, and he said, "What do I do now, I am going to Srinager?" And I suggested to him that

you ask Musharraf to visit us. And he said "Now? On what grounds?" And I said "On grounds of humanity. We are almost one fifth of mankind. Ask him." So he made a speech in Srinager, and there he did use the word "humanity," and the word he used was **[Hindi quotation]**. And so he came, Musharraf then changed – he was, if you remember, the chief executive officer, before he came, but protocol would have then stood in the way, so it was changed to president. We had earlier proposed that the meeting be held in Goa, so that it's away from the assaults and invasions of the media, but then Musharraf wanted it in Delhi. And in that press breakfast meeting, he got carried away, and then, of course, when he got carried away it was being broadcast all over India, and Prime Minister Vajpayee and the full cabinet was there, everybody was there, we were assaulted by repeated telephone calls: "How could you agree to what he said?" And that was it. The other aspect – again, at the cost of promoting my book called *Call to Honor*, I am the author of that book – in that book there is a lovely discussion of this subject. Buy that book.

QUESTION: So actually, I was very much confused, in your speech you never once mentioned Kashmir in the speech you were giving here. I'm pretty sure that that is one of the main reasons why we are not having great relations with Pakistan. And the other thing is that if you are talking about triangles, then do you think that the United States should mediate between India and Pakistan and Kashmir talks? And if it does, will it not be against the long-standing policies of the Indian government that Kashmir is a private issue and no one else should mediate it.

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: I don't know where you have jumped to the conclusion about my recommending that the United States be an umpire, as it were. India and Pakistan speak the same language, we don't need interpreters, and we have to find the answer to our problem. The United States of America is 8,500 miles away, we are not even eight and a half minutes away, so we don't need the United States to find answers to our problems. Jammu and Kashmir is a consequence, it's not a cause; if you understand that difference, the answers to the challenge of Jammu and Kashmir will arise.

QUESTION: Thank you. I see the potential of homegrown jihadist terrorism as a source of concern. I see tensions bubbling underneath the Indian surface, and it's a topic which I've spoken with Professor Frankel about. So I want to hear your perspective on that and to ask you if you think both countries could find greater common ground in dealing with this challenge. Thank you.

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: Yes, but I don't see why one should not better understand the use of the phrase "jihad." There is a historical reality which I would like to share with you. From about 1833 onward, not once did the ulema of Islam give a call for jihad in India. Not once. The second – which, again, I will share as a fact with you (I will not talk of British India) – not once did the Islamic ulema use the word "jihad" in any of the what is somewhat relatively called "native states" of India. Not once. Now, I'd like some scholar to research this, as to why was this not done. I once had occasion

to ask B.K. Nehru, who was also in the government of Jammu and Kashmir…he took great interest in me, he was much older than me, and he was from the Nehru family and I was a political opponent of him…I am still. And I asked Mr. B.K. Nehru, what is it that is happening in the government of Jammu and Kashmir? What is it that is happening, because the Islam in Jammu and Kashmir is the most wonderful example of the integration of Sufi and other thoughts, what is happening? And he said, "It is all these fellows who have come from UP." In which sense, I quite often say – I don't say it pejoratively, but I say – there is a sad recognition that Pakistan is perhaps the stepchild of UP. It's true, please reflect on it. And therefore, when you talk of jihad, and India and Pakistan working together on jihad, India and Pakistan have to work together on what I call the renaissance of Islam, not just jihad. India contributed so much to Islam…it went back to Iran, the Sufi thought, were always writing that the great center of Islamic thought, the great seminaries of Islam were in India. So please don't focus only on one aspect of it.

DEVESH KAPUR: If I may, it would be good to get reflections from all three of you on the role of China as you look forward. Would you feel it might be a stabilizing force in Pakistan? If you look at the past, it's sort of given a blanket check to Pakistan in many areas. How do you see, down the line, how this China-Pakistan relationship as a force that might moderate Pakistan, or not?

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: There is a conundrum here, but I'll try to make it a very short reply, though it is difficult here. Firstly, whatever I say is conditioned by the

fact that, in 1962, I was a soldier and I was in the northeast of India. So, secondly, I work on the basis that People's Republic of China, culturally and civilizationally, works on the basis of somehow getting the adversity to be psychologically subservient, which is what they are trying to do now with the United States. Thirdly, an inherent question of real politics: why should People's Republic of China, in any sense, make life easy for India? And it is a very cost-effective option that they have, which is to encircle India and keep a gate. It is so cost-effective for People's Republic that, at virtually no cost to itself, it keeps India tied down. Why should it change its policy?

DEVESH KAPUR: Francine, do you have any thoughts?

FRANCINE FRANKEL: I of course agree exactly with what Jaswant Singh has just said. I think that the Chinese-Pakistan connection is, again, a very dangerous development for India, and China has been more vociferous about its continuing arms and other assistance to Pakistan in recent months. It has also been much more unrestrained in making claims in the northeast. So, I would think that if you have China present in Pakistan and extending its influence – in Balujistan, in particular, there are reports even of intelligence infiltration into Balujistan – and so China, now, is present on both sides of India and virtually in Pakistan's territory and in India's territory. I just recently saw an article in the Indian press saying that the Indian government doesn't know how much territory the Chinese have taken in the northeast. So, to me that's extremely serious, but I presume it is very serious from the point of view of India's defense forces, because, this year, there has been a new defense strategy which anticipates the need to

plan for a two front war, and this is the first time, I believe, since 1971 that this is considered a contingency which needs to be anticipated. So no, I don't think China is a force for any kind of stabilization in the region.

DEVESH KAPUR: Bruce, any thoughts?

BRUCE RIEDEL: Well, I think I'm in the same place, but I would just like to use a great historical example. The Nixon administration thought that it could use Pakistan to open the door to China, which in the end it did. But ironically, the reverse that came from China to Pakistan was the nuclear design for Pakistan's nuclear weapons. So the unintended consequences of policies that you think are going one way, in this case were quite disastrous in the long run.

QUESTION: In June 2002, the United States Embassy and the British High Commission and other embassies evacuated their non-essential personnel and dependents from New Delhi. I was actually one of the people who was evacuated at that time, and I always wondered whether that had an effect upon your administration, in terms of…the idea, I think, was to embarrass the Indian administration to reduce the rhetoric in terms of what was always called "nuclear saber rattling," at that time. And I just, I wondered, from your perspective, whether that actually had an influence in your policies.

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: The advisories that were issued that year by both the United States of America and, following the U.S. example, by the U.K. were really unnecessary, because, if you only happened to walk on what is called Rajpath, in the

evenings, you would have found that ice cream vendors were selling ice cream, children were playing, there was the usual chaos of Delhi, there was no more hysteria over the question of a nuclear war. So whether it was a signal to India, or it was a signal to Pakistan, is one of those questions to which, after a bit, I stopped trying to find an answer.

QUESTION: I actually have a question for Professor Frankel. You are also an expert in political economy, so, would the economic sphere – you know, we are supposed to be the global leader of production, consumption, etc. – would that be a saving force for all of us? I'm sure all of us want to go back without being *too* scared, perhaps. But, seriously, would the economic sphere, you know, play a role in geopolitics, and would that be a stabilizing force in some sense?

FRANCINE FRANKEL: If you're talking about India's high rate of growth, I presume? Certainly that has made India into an attractive place for investment. At the same time – and I always apologize because I do tend to look at negatives as well as positives – I'm just writing a paper right now on the impact of concentrating on getting the growth rates up in a society that is very unequal, because what tends to happen is the inequalities increase, and this has occurred in India and it has occurred along with a rise in political violence. Unless the government can handle that, and they're really talking about it in terms of the way we talk about Kandahar or another part of Afghanistan, that there are areas that are no-go areas in India for the government, that they can't do development. So, if someone prescient reads that India is going to be chaotic, it's not going to be a

good place to have investments, then you have to say it's too soon to conclude that simply getting the growth rates up, or even the ability to get the growth rates up, if you have enough disruption, is taken for granted.

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: Devesh very kindly asked me to a class yesterday, which he was teaching, and I shared because I was, for some strange reason, made the Finance Minister of my country, which I was for a certain number of years, and I won't go into a full account of that, just two things: It's literally across the road that I had to walk, from south block to what is called north block, there was a posse of press men there waiting to ask me what my policy was. I had not thought of any policy, so I said my policy was quite clear, I want to put more money in the housewife's purse and more food in the poor man's belly. And the second thing I said was, stop worshipping GDP. People cannot eat GDP; concentrate on "gross national contentment." And I was very happy when His Majesty the King of Bhutan, with whom I had very good relations, subsequently made that the policy of his country. Also, I was very touched that President Sarkozy recently appointed a commission, with Amartya Sen and Stieglitz, to work out as to how to spread greater contentment, rather than greater production.

QUESTION: Mr. Singh, you just mentioned a few minutes ago that China is very interested in tying India down. Could you be a bit more specific? In what way is India being tied down, and what do you envision India's greater role in the world to be? Do we want to become a Britain of Asia, or do we want to be a country that is more independent and is more local in what it does?

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: No, India would have to be India, not Great Britain, and how it has to counter the encirclement of India…the first freedom. The first has to be the breaking away of the psychological, because I believe that, not so much the military or the Ministry of Defense now, but the Ministry of External Affairs of India continues to be intimidated by having to deal with People's Republic of China as equals. That is a reality; I speak from personal experience. Like Bruce very kindly spoke, when I started my very first conversation with Strobe (in his wonderful office so relative of undergraduate disorder) I told him that, look, I'm there for finding the way to good relations between India and the United States of America. We have a saying in Pakistan, that if you do not wish to go to the village, don't ask the way to it. I do want to go to that village, it's got good relations, do you, Strobe, want to go to that village? And he said, "Yes, I want to go to that village."

I was talking in similar terms with my counterpart, a very able foreign officer of People's Republic. And as is the habit of a number of foreign officers, he banged the table, he displayed great anger, and then he said, "You broke this chain and now you must reestablish it." And I had to tell him that for it to be done, "I can't clap with one hand, you have to clap with me, and if you clap with me, we will establish good relations." That's what India has to do, not as a subservient, but as an equal to People's Republic, as equal countries.

QUESTION: Hi, good evening everybody. My question is that the U.S. has always been aware of the ground situation in Pakistan, military, civil, and everything. Why do we still

have so many weapons and defense teams between U.S. and Pakistan. Isn't that creating a situation of turmoil in that region? Because what I remember from what I Googled, is that there was a deal of submarines and aircrafts between the U.S. and Pakistan. If that was to fight with the militants and terrorists, submarines are not required, because they are in Pakistan and Afghanistan – these are land-locked countries. Why do we need submarines? Can you please answer this question?

BRUCE RIEDEL: I'm not aware of an American submarine deal with Pakistan, I believe that's a French deal. I'd check your Google again. You said "Americans have always been aware," I wish that was the case. I think that we lived – I talked about denial before – I think there's been a long period of denial about the realities of the situation in Pakistan in Washington. George Bush famously said that he liked to look in people's eyes and he could read their intentions. Well, I think when he looked in Musharraf's eyes he must have had some kind of tinted lenses on, because we got taken for quite a ride for a long time.

But let me answer the question very seriously, because it's a very serious question and a very difficult question. I'll give a concrete example. When the Pakistani army decided, reluctantly and against all of its instincts, to go into the Swat valley this past summer and take on part of the militancy, it began using F16s to bomb their camps, because they don't have effective attack helicopters. It was the only weapon system they felt they had. Their pilots were given pictures of the targets, literally, and pasted them on the dashboard (there's a nicer word for dashboard, but I can't think of it right now), and that was supposed to be how they were supposed to find the target. That is not twenty-

first century air-power. They came to the United States after that and said, we would like to get advanced imaging systems to put on our F16s, we're going to go into South Waziristan now, and we want to be able to more effectively use our systems. Well, here's the dilemma: the same electrical optical imaging system you put on an F16 to bomb a terrorist target in South Waziristan will be extremely useful in delivering a nuclear weapon. But that's the real decision you have to make. What are you going to do? Are you going to say, "Yes, we want you to take on the militants, but we want you to do it by pasting their pictures on the cockpit dashboard," or do you want to say, "Yes, we want you to do it and we're going to give you equipment to deal with it." And there's no way you can give them the equipment and say, you know, "If you fly out of your own borders, somehow it will magically go away." That's Jack Ryan novels, it's not the real world.

DEVESH KAPUR: So we have one last question here, because we're running out of time.

QUESTION: So my question is for Mr. Singh: If there are specific aspects of India's current foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan that you had the option of changing, what would they be?

THE HONORABLE JASWANT SINGH: I think if there could be a short and simple answer, first, please realize that Indo-Pak relations are extremely sensitive. They are nervous and are given to frequent fracture. Therefore, have patience. Keep mending fractures as they take place. Secondly, don't let the street drive policy; display the leadership that is needed. I shared an Arabic saying with Professor Kapur's class

yesterday – there is an Arabic saying that if the caravan were to stop every time the village dogs barked, it will never reach. Therefore, don't let the incidents of terrorist actions intimidate two countries from talking to each other. Countries must not go into non-speech, particularly when we are neighbors, and particularly if you don't want the street to drive the policy. The present government has its difficulties. Like anywhere else in the world, politicians do need job security, and job security comes from votes, and votes come from the street, and the street, therefore, begins to drive policy.

DEVESH KAPUR: Well, thank you so much. It's been a great thrill having you here. We are very privileged that you could come. Thank you Francine, thank you Bruce for taking the time, and thank you all for being here this evening.